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THE STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARDS  
OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
Tara Leigh Grove∗ 
Scholars have long debated Congress’s power to curb federal jurisdiction and have 
consistently assumed that the constitutional limits on Congress’s authority (if any) must 
be judicially enforceable and found in the text and structure of Article III.  In this 
Article, I challenge that fundamental assumption.  I argue that the primary 
constitutional protection for the federal judiciary lies instead in the bicameralism and 
presentment requirements of Article I.  These Article I lawmaking procedures give 
competing political factions (even political minorities) considerable power to “veto” 
legislation.  Drawing on recent social science and legal scholarship, I argue that political 
factions are particularly likely to use their structural veto to block jurisdiction-stripping 
legislation favored by their opponents.  Notably, this structural argument is supported by 
the history of congressional control over federal jurisdiction.  When the federal courts 
have issued controversial opinions that trigger wide public condemnation, supporters of 
the judiciary — even when they were only a political minority in Congress — repeatedly 
used their structural veto to block jurisdiction-stripping proposals.  This structural 
approach also provides one answer to a puzzle that has particularly troubled scholars: 
whether there are any constitutional limits on Congress’s authority to make “exceptions” 
to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  The structural safeguards of Article I have 
proven especially effective at preventing encroachments on the Supreme Court’s Article 
III appellate review power. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
here is a recurring concern among scholars of federal courts and 
federal jurisdiction that Article III is at war with itself.1  Article 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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Neal Devins, Michael Dorf, Richard Fallon, Barry Friedman, Michael Gerhart, Mike Klarman, 
David Landau, Gary Lawson, Daryl Levinson, Wayne Logan, John Manning, Dan Markel, Dan 
Meltzer, Gillian Metzger, Henry Monaghan, Jim Pfander, Gregg Polsky, Jim Rossi, Mark Seiden-
feld, and David Shapiro.  Many thanks also to the participants at the Junior Scholars’ Federal 
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Law (October 2010), and Emory University School of Law (November 2010).  I am also grateful 
to my husband David Davies for his help and support throughout the process of researching and 
writing this Article. 
 1 See, e.g., Laurence Claus, The One Court that Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Su-
premacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59, 61 (2007) (“The Article III about which we learn in 
Federal Jurisdiction class is a text at war with itself.”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress 
to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 
1365 (1953) (suggesting that, if Article III gives Congress unlimited power over the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction, then “the Constitution . . . authoriz[es] its own destruction”); Law-
rence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term — Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on 
Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 67–
 
T
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III states that “[t]he judicial Power . . . shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish.”2  That provision further states that this 
“judicial Power shall extend to all Cases” arising under federal law,3 
and that the Supreme Court “shall have appellate Jurisdiction” over 
such federal question cases.4  But Article III also declares that the 
Court’s appellate review power is subject to “such Exceptions, 
and . . . such Regulations as the Congress shall make”5 and does not 
require Congress to create any inferior federal courts to exercise the ju-
risdiction that is “excepted” from the Supreme Court’s purview.  Ar-
ticle III thereby suggests that, although the Constitution “vest[s]” the 
federal courts with the “judicial Power” to resolve issues of federal law, 
the Constitution also allows Congress to take that power away. 
I argue here that this apparent constitutional tension largely disap-
pears once we expand our focus beyond Article III.  The federal judi-
cial power is primarily protected not by the provisions defining the 
courts’ authority, but instead by the structural provisions controlling 
the authority of Congress.  The constitutional process for enacting leg-
islation, which requires all legislative proposals to pass through two 
chambers of Congress and be presented to the President (or, in the 
event of a presidential veto, to survive supermajority votes in the 
House and Senate), provides considerable protection for federal juris-
diction.  These bicameralism and presentment requirements allow po-
litical minorities to veto, or restrict the content of, any legislation. 
Recent social science and legal scholarship suggests that political 
minorities will be particularly inclined to exercise this veto power over 
jurisdiction-stripping legislation favored by their opponents.  First, 
scholars have argued that, in a competitive political system (like the 
United States), risk-averse politicians favor an independent judiciary 
as a useful means of controlling their political opponents during pe-
riods when their own side is out of power.  Likewise, such risk-averse 
politicians should be inclined to veto legislation that would allow their 
opponents’ policies to escape federal court review.  This assumption is 
further supported by a separate group of social scientists who urge 
that, in our politically divided society, the overall content of federal 
court decisions is generally favored by at least one major political  
faction. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
68 (1981) (arguing that, if Article III gives Congress plenary power over federal jurisdiction, then 
the provisions of Article III are “at war with one another,” id. at 67). 
 2 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 3 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 4 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 5 Id. 
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Social scientists argue that such political conditions facilitate the es-
tablishment and long-term maintenance of an independent judiciary.  
But, standing alone, these political incentives are a “fragile” protection 
for the federal courts.6  When courts issue controversial and unpopular 
decisions, political leaders may forget the long-term benefits of an in-
dependent judiciary and attempt to strip federal jurisdiction. 
The bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I pro-
vide a “check” on such short-term political incentives.  As long as the 
faction supporting the judiciary retains sufficient political strength in 
one chamber of Congress or the Presidency — even if it is only a polit-
ical minority — it can veto such jurisdiction-stripping attempts. 
This structural argument is supported by the history of congres-
sional control over federal jurisdiction.  In the late nineteenth and ear-
ly twentieth centuries, the federal judiciary was viewed as biased in 
favor of big business, and there were accordingly numerous attempts 
to strip federal jurisdiction over suits involving corporations.  Begin-
ning in the mid-twentieth century, and as recently as 2006, the primary 
target was the constitutional jurisprudence of the Warren Court (and 
its progeny).  Countless bills were introduced to strip Supreme Court 
and inferior federal court jurisdiction over constitutional issues rang-
ing from reapportionment to the use of “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance. 
But, in both cases, the overall content of federal jurisprudence had 
the support of at least one major political faction.  In the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, economic nationalists within the 
Republican Party, who sought to enhance the industrial and commer-
cial power of the United States, strongly supported the federal judi-
ciary’s pro-business decisions.  In more recent times, the federal 
courts’ constitutional jurisprudence has found favor with social pro-
gressives (primarily housed in the Democratic Party).  Each political 
faction — even when it was only a political minority in Congress — 
repeatedly used its structural veto points to prevent encroachments on 
the federal judicial power. 
Notably, I do not claim that these structural constraints are an ab-
solute bulwark against attempts to limit federal jurisdiction.  On sev-
eral occasions, Congress has displaced the inferior federal courts by re-
ferring matters to state courts or to administrative and military 
tribunals (albeit leaving the latter subject to Supreme Court review).  
And although it has proven more difficult to strip the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction, two such efforts have successfully navigated the 
bicameralism and presentment hurdles of Article I.  Nevertheless, de-
spite these limitations, supporters of the judiciary have repeatedly used 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 See sources cited infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
  
2011] STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 873 
the structural veto points created by Article I to safeguard federal  
jurisdiction. 
This structural approach differs considerably from prior scholar-
ship on Congress’s authority over federal jurisdiction.7  Previously, 
scholars have assumed either that there must be judicially enforceable 
limits on Congress’s power, or that there are no constitutional limits 
and the federal judicial power is simply a matter of legislative will (or 
benevolence).  These scholars have overlooked a central feature of our 
constitutional design: that the primary protection for many of our most 
precious rights and liberties (of which the independent judiciary forms 
a crucial part) would be structural.8 
Indeed, this method of constitutional enforcement accords with the 
purpose of our constitutional system of separated powers.  James Mad-
ison hoped that the Constitution “could be made politically self-
enforcing by aligning the political interests of officials . . . with consti-
tutional rights and rules.”9  “The great security . . . consists in giving to 
those who administer each department the necessary constitutional 
means and personal motives to resist encroachments” on constitutional 
principles.10  Although I do not claim that all constitutional values can 
be effectively protected by the lawmaking processes of Article I, I do 
contend that political factions have repeatedly found it in their interest 
to use the structural tools of Article I to protect the Article III judicial 
power. 
I lay out the argument for these structural safeguards as follows.  
In Part II, I explain that prior scholarship, in searching for constraints 
on Congress’s power to curb federal jurisdiction, has repeatedly looked 
for judicially enforceable limits in Article III.  I assert that the primary 
protection for the federal judiciary can instead be found in the law-
making processes of Article I.  In Parts III and IV, I provide historical 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 See infra pp. 874–75 for a discussion of the prior scholarship. 
 8 Moreover, this analysis links up with a growing literature in constitutional law, which em-
phasizes that the structural constraints on federal power are inherently intertwined with (and 
largely dependent upon) the political processes of government.  See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the 
Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 219 (2000) 
(urging that “federalism . . . has been safeguarded by a complex system of informal political insti-
tutions (of which political parties have historically been the most important)”); Daryl J. Levinson 
& Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2329 (2006) (ar-
guing that “any understanding of the . . . separation of powers should start from the recognition” 
that it works alongside a political party system).  For a brief discussion of how the analysis here 
differs from some of that prior work, see infra note 268. 
 9 Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, 
Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1832 (2009); see also Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Pol-
itics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 662 (2011) (not-
ing that Madison “hoped and hypothesized that the Constitution could be made politically self-
enforcing by selectively empowering political decisionmakers whose interests and incentives 
would remain in alignment with constitutional values”). 
 10 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 318–19 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
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support for this claim.  I argue that, from the post–Civil War era to the 
present day, the political factions supporting the judiciary have repeat-
edly used their structural veto points to preserve federal jurisdiction.  
Finally, in Part V, I discuss the scope and limits of these structural  
safeguards, noting that they have been especially effective at protect-
ing the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  Even when Congress 
has displaced the inferior federal courts, it has consistently preserved 
the Supreme Court’s Article III judicial power. 
II.  THE THEORY 
Scholars have long puzzled over the scope of Congress’s authority 
to regulate federal jurisdiction, and particularly the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.  Although most scholars agree that Congress’s 
power is limited by constitutional sources other than Article III 
(known as “external” limits),11 they strongly dispute whether there are 
any “internal” limits — that is, whether the provisions of Article III (as 
elucidated by the constitutional text, structure, and history) themselves 
constrain Congress.  Commentators differ considerably in their ap-
proaches to this question, but they do appear to agree on one thing: 
any such constitutional limits must be judicially enforceable.  I argue 
that this scholarship overlooks a critical structural protection for  
the federal judiciary: the bicameralism and presentment procedures of  
Article I.12 
A.  The Search for a Judicially Enforceable Baseline in Article III 
Many commentators have concluded, based on the text and struc-
ture of Article III, that Congress has plenary power to restrict federal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 For example, there is broad consensus that Congress may not enact a jurisdictional measure 
that violates the Equal Protection Clause or the Suspension Clause of Article I, Section 9.  Al-
though scholars dispute the precise scope of these external constraints, they generally agree that 
these provisions limit Congress’s power.  See Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail 
Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 
916–22 (1984) (discussing some of the debates and noting that all scholars seem to agree that “the 
Bill of Rights applies to all areas of congressional action” and that “Congress could not limit 
access to the federal courts on the basis of race,” id. at 916); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an 
Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 607–08 (2009) (noting that the Suspension Clause, “[b]y its 
terms, . . . constitutes . . . a limitation upon . . . congressional power” over habeas jurisdiction, id. 
at 607, but also observing that scholars have debated whether the clause imposes an affirmative 
duty on Congress to confer habeas jurisdiction). 
 12 I use the term “jurisdiction stripping” throughout this Article to refer to efforts to restrict 
federal jurisdiction over a class of cases (such as cases involving abortion or school prayer).  Such 
jurisdictional restrictions are likewise the focus of other scholarly literature on this subject.  Ac-
cordingly, I do not include within that definition other types of statutory limitations on federal 
jurisdiction, such as amount-in-controversy requirements. 
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jurisdiction.13  Article III, they observe, does not purport to place any 
constraints on Congress’s authority over the Supreme Court’s appel-
late jurisdiction, but expressly states that the Court’s jurisdiction is 
subject to “such Exceptions, and . . . such Regulations as the Congress 
shall make.”14  According to these scholars, this Exceptions Clause 
gives Congress broad power to remove cases from the Court’s appel-
late oversight.15  There is even greater consensus on Congress’s au-
thority over inferior federal court jurisdiction.  Under Article III, the 
creation of the lower federal courts is left to the discretion of Con-
gress.16  Most commentators conclude that Congress may also deter-
mine to what extent such courts are needed to enforce federal law.17  
Notably, the Supreme Court has likewise consistently stated (albeit of-
ten in dicta) that Congress’s authority over federal jurisdiction, includ-
ing the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, is unconstrained by Article III.18 
Of course, even those who subscribe to this “plenary power” theory 
doubt the wisdom of Congress actually exercising its authority.19  For 
example, Professor Paul Bator argued that “[a] statute depriving the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW 18 (1981) (“My own posi-
tion is . . . that Congress does have very significant power over the courts’ jurisdiction.”); Raoul 
Berger, Insulation of Judicial Usurpation: A Comment on Lawrence Sager’s “Court-Stripping” Po-
lemic, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 614 (1983) (urging that Congress has plenary power over federal ju-
risdiction); John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and 
the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 204 (1997) (same); Martin H. Redish, Text, Struc-
ture, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633, 1637 (1990) 
(arguing that “the inescapable implication of the text is that Congress possesses broad power to 
curb the jurisdiction of both the lower courts and the Supreme Court”); Herbert Wechsler, The 
Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1965) (same); see also Daniel J. 
Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1569 (1990) (describing 
this “plenary authority” position as “the traditional view of article III”). 
 14 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 15 See Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 
VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1038 (1982) (urging that the Exceptions Clause “plainly seems to indicate that 
if Congress wishes to exclude a certain category of federal constitutional (or other) litigation from 
the [Supreme Court’s] appellate jurisdiction, it has the authority to do so”); Berger, supra note 13, 
at 622 (same); Gunther, supra note 11, at 901 (same); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to 
Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and 
External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 901–02 (1982) (same).   
 16 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Sager, supra note 1, at 48. 
 17 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 15, at 1030–31 (arguing that the Constitution “leaves it to Con-
gress to decide, having created lower federal courts, what their jurisdiction should be”); sources 
cited supra note 13. 
 18 See, e.g., The “Francis Wright,” 105 U.S. 381, 386 (1882) (“Not only may whole classes of 
cases be kept out of the [Supreme Court’s appellate] jurisdiction altogether, but particular classes 
of questions may be subjected to re-examination and review, while others are not.”); Sheldon v. 
Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“Congress may withhold from any court of its creation ju-
risdiction of any of the enumerated controversies.”). 
 19 See Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1894 (2008) 
(“Advocates of the traditional view . . . emphasize that although Congress’s power is broad, . . .  
generally speaking, Congress would be unwise to exercise the power.”). 
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Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over . . . constitutional litiga-
tion would . . . violate the spirit of the Constitution, even if it would 
not violate its letter.”20  Likewise, Professor Martin Redish has urged 
that, “as a matter of policy,” Congress should have a “very strong pre-
sumption against” restrictions on federal jurisdiction.21  Nevertheless, 
these scholars reach what they view as the “inescapable” conclusion 
from Article III that “Congress possesses broad power to curb the ju-
risdiction of both the lower courts and the Supreme Court.”22 
But other commentators have concluded that there must be judi-
cially enforceable limits on Congress’s power, and that the substantive 
baseline for such limits can be derived from the text, structure, and 
history of Article III.  Several scholars have focused on preserving the 
authority of the federal judiciary as a whole.  These scholars empha-
size that, by guaranteeing life tenure and salary protections to federal 
judges,23 Article III renders federal courts structurally distinct from 
state courts.24  This lack of “parity” between federal and state courts 
requires that certain matters be referred to the independent federal  
judiciary.25 
For example, Professor Robert Clinton argues that Congress must 
“allocate to the federal judiciary as a whole each and every type of 
case or controversy” listed in Article III.26  Professors Akhil Amar and 
Lawrence Sager offer related (but more nuanced) accounts.  Professor 
Amar asserts that the federal judiciary must retain jurisdiction over all 
cases arising under federal law,27 while Professor Sager insists that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 Bator, supra note 15, at 1039. 
 21 Martin H. Redish, Same-Sex Marriage, the Constitution, and Congressional Power to Con-
trol Federal Jurisdiction: Be Careful What You Wish For, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 363, 369 
(2005). 
 22 Redish, supra note 13, at 1637. 
 23 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 24 See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of 
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 230 (1985) (emphasizing that “[t]he structural mechan-
isms to assure independence and competence in the federal judiciary . . . are the same for all Ar-
ticle III judges, supreme and inferior.  No similar mechanisms are prescribed by the Constitution 
for state judges”); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided 
Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 754, 762 (1984) (not-
ing that “federal judges . . . , unlike their state counterparts, were constitutionally guaranteed 
judicial independence,” id. at 754); Sager, supra note 1, at 66 (urging that, “[i]f there were no limits 
on congressional power to make state courts the exclusive, unreviewed arbiters of article III busi-
ness, Congress could run roughshod over article III’s tenure and salary requirements”). 
 25 E.g., Amar, supra note 24, at 230 (arguing that because “state court judges do not en-
joy . . . constitutional parity” with federal judges, state courts may not “be trusted with the power 
to resolve finally federal questions and admiralty issues”). 
 26 Clinton, supra note 24, at 750.  Clinton also notes the possibility of an exception to this rule 
for “trivial” cases that would unnecessarily burden the federal courts.  
 27 See Amar, supra note 24, at 209–10 (arguing that under Article III Congress must give the 
federal courts jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law as well as admiralty and ambassa-
dor suits but may leave other matters to state courts). 
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some Article III forum must be available to resolve federal constitu-
tional claims.28  Under this approach, Congress may take federal juris-
diction over such Article III matters away from either the inferior fed-
eral courts or the Supreme Court, but not both. 
By contrast, a growing number of commentators have focused 
more specifically on the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  They 
assert that the Court has a unique role in the constitutional scheme 
and that Congress must provide the Court with sufficient jurisdiction 
to perform that role.  The foundation for this argument was laid in a 
famous essay by Professor Henry Hart.  Professor Hart declared that 
“the exceptions [to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction] must not be such 
as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitu-
tional plan.”29  Professor Leonard Ratner later expanded upon this 
theory by arguing that the Supreme Court’s “essential appellate func-
tions” are to preserve the uniformity and supremacy of federal law.30 
Scholars have recently supplemented these arguments by focusing 
on the structure of the judiciary.  They urge that the Constitution 
creates a hierarchical judiciary and thereby gives the Supreme Court 
the authority to instruct lower courts on the content of federal law.31  
These commentators focus on the language in Article III designating 
one Court as “supreme” and all other federal courts as “inferior.”32  
Most scholars also conclude that state courts must abide by Supreme 
Court decisions as part of the “supreme” federal law under the Supre-
macy Clause.33 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 See Sager, supra note 1, at 66 (contending that “Congress . . . must provide persons who ad-
vance claims of federal constitutional right an opportunity to secure review — in some article III 
court — of the state court’s disposition”). 
 29 Hart, supra note 1, at 1365. 
 30 Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 161 (1960); see also Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints 
on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929, 
935 (1982). 
 31 See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 817, 873 (1994) (urging that the Court’s “essential function” is to “provid[e] general 
leadership in defining federal law”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tara Leigh Grove, 
The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (noting that the 
Court has long been viewed as having “a leading role in defining the content of federal law for the 
judiciary”). 
 32 U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. 
 33 See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris 
Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 276 n.106 (1992) (contending that lower federal and state courts 
have an “obligation to follow Supreme Court precedent”); Caminker, supra note 31, at 834 (com-
menting on the forcefulness of the proposition that “Article III commands all inferior federal 
courts to obey Supreme Court precedent”); Claus, supra note 1, at 71 (asserting that the Constitu-
tion “subordinates all other courts’ conclusions on Article III issues to those of the one [Supreme] 
Court”); Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 390 (contending that the Court’s constitutional decisions “are at least a 
form of federal common law” and “are binding federal law under the supremacy clause”); James 
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Many commentators have argued that the Court’s “supreme” role 
atop the judicial hierarchy places judicially enforceable limits on Con-
gress’s authority over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  Professor 
Evan Caminker, for example, contends that the Court’s supreme status 
supports the “essential functions” theory of Professors Hart and Rat-
ner.34  Professor Caminker asserts that the Supreme Court’s “essential 
function” is to “provid[e] general leadership in defining federal law” for 
the judiciary.35  He thus concludes that Congress must provide the 
Court with “subject matter jurisdiction sufficiently broad” to perform 
that function.36 
Several other scholars have recently claimed that, in order to main-
tain its “supreme” role, the Supreme Court must have the authority to 
review every lower court case involving federal law.  Professor James 
Pfander asserts that the Court must be able to review all lower federal 
and state court decisions either on direct appeal or by issuing “supervi-
sory writs,” such as writs of habeas corpus or mandamus, in individual 
cases.37  Other commentators, including Professors Steven Calabresi 
and Gary Lawson, have argued that the Supreme Court must have the 
authority to review every federal question, either as an original matter 
or on appeal from a lower court.38  These scholars claim that the Ex-
ceptions Clause does not permit Congress to “strip” the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction at all, but only to move cases between the Court’s 
original and appellate jurisdiction (a position that, they acknowledge, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 649 (2004) (asserting that lower federal courts “must respect” Supreme 
Court precedent); James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Consti-
tutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 202 (2007) [hereinafter 
Pfander, Federal Supremacy] (arguing that state courts must “give effect to federal law as pro-
nounced by the Supreme Court”).  A few scholars, however, doubt that all lower courts must ab-
ide by Supreme Court precedent.  See Caminker, supra note 31, at 837–38 (urging that inferior 
federal courts have such an obligation, but doubting that “state courts [must] obey Supreme Court 
federal law precedents,” id. at 838); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Vari-
ations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover’s Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 82–88 (1989) 
(arguing that lower courts can initially disregard “clearly erroneous” constitutional interpretations 
but must comply with precedent if a higher court reverses that decision, id. at 87). 
 34 See Caminker, supra note 31, at 835. 
 35 Id. at 873 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36 Id. at 837. 
 37 Pfander, Federal Supremacy, supra note 33, at 236 (making a similar claim with respect to 
state courts); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Super-
vise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1500 (2000) [hereinafter Pfander, Jurisdiction-
Stripping] (arguing that it would raise “serious constitutional questions” if Congress eliminated 
both the Court’s appellate jurisdiction and its authority to supervise lower federal courts by is-
suing discretionary writs). 
 38 See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, 
and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 
1023, 1032–33 (2007) [hereinafter Calabresi & Lawson, Jurisdiction Stripping]; Claus, supra note 
1, at 64. 
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is at odds with the holding of Marbury v. Madison39 that Congress 
may not enlarge the size of the Court’s original jurisdiction).40 
Although each of the above proposals offers a forceful analysis, 
each one has difficulties as an account of judicially enforceable limits 
on congressional power.  First, the notion that the Supreme Court 
must be permitted to review every federal question is difficult to rec-
oncile with the text of the Exceptions Clause, which seems to permit 
Congress to leave at least some federal questions to the lower courts 
for final resolution.41  Second, the “essential functions” thesis does 
leave space for the exercise of Congress’s authority under the Excep-
tions Clause but is also largely indeterminate.42  This approach does 
not seem to offer a judicially manageable standard to guide the Court 
in determining “how much” jurisdiction is necessary for it to perform 
its “essential functions.”  Finally, the contention that Congress must 
confer on the federal courts as a whole the power to hear some number 
of Article III cases is (as others have noted) difficult to reconcile with 
the history of federal jurisdiction and may give insufficient weight to 
the “important role that delegates to the Convention expected the Su-
preme Court to play.”43 
But despite the differences among these analyses of Article III, the 
above proposals do reflect certain shared normative assumptions.  
Scholars repeatedly rely on the following two normative premises: 
Congress has a duty to provide the federal courts with sufficient juris-
diction to exercise the Article III “judicial Power,” and a more specific 
duty to ensure the Supreme Court’s unique role in the judiciary.44 
I accept these normative assumptions as a starting point of analy-
sis.  I also agree that there should be constitutional constraints on 
Congress’s power to curb federal jurisdiction.  But in contrast to the 
above accounts, I do not seek to derive a judicially enforceable test 
from the text and structure of Article III.  Instead, I begin by asking a 
descriptive question: why the Supreme Court has almost never faced 
the question whether Article III contains any such substantive limits 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 40 Id. at 174–80; see Calabresi & Lawson, Jurisdiction Stripping, supra note 38, at 1036–43; 
Claus, supra note 1, at 77–80, 107.  Professor William Van Alstyne previously proposed this read-
ing of the Exceptions Clause.  See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madi-
son, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 31–33. 
 41 Cf. Sager, supra note 1, at 33 (“Readings of the exceptions clause that give Congress no pow-
er to limit the kinds of cases the Court can review . . . have a very hard go of it.”). 
 42 See Gunther, supra note 11, at 903 (“Critics of the [‘essential functions’] thesis . . . emphasize 
the . . . open-ended nature of the limit . . . .”). 
 43 Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1610; see id. at 1585–93, 1599–1602, 1617–18. 
 44 Indeed, even scholars who subscribe to the “plenary power” theory seem to share these 
normative assumptions.  See sources cited supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
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on congressional power.  In other words, I examine why Congress has 
so rarely enacted jurisdiction-stripping legislation. 
This analysis leads me to challenge the widespread assumption 
among scholars that the federal judiciary can only be protected (if at 
all) by a judicially enforceable standard found in Article III.  Instead, I 
argue that certain structural and political constraints in Article I help 
protect federal jurisdiction generally and, more specifically, help ensure 
that Congress respects the Supreme Court’s spot atop the judicial  
hierarchy.45 
B.  The Structural Safeguards of Article I 
Article I provides that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a 
Law, be presented to the President.”46  If the President signs the bill, it 
becomes law.47  But if the President vetoes the bill, then “it shall be-
come a Law” only “if approved by two thirds” of the members of both 
the House and the Senate.48 
As various social scientists and legal scholars have observed, these 
bicameralism and presentment procedures effectively create a super-
majority requirement for all federal legislation, because they force rep-
resentatives of different political constituencies to agree before any bill 
is enacted into law.49  “To secure a majority in two different houses, 
which are elected by different groups of voters, requires more support 
from the public than simply securing a majority in one house.”50  As 
Professor John Manning has pointed out, that is uniquely true of “[t]he 
particular brand of bicameralism established by the U.S. Constitu-
tion,”51 which gives each state an equal vote in the Senate.52  This 
structure effectively “assign[s] the inhabitants of the small states  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 45 Notably, my analysis draws upon the widely accepted practice of making inferences from 
constitutional structure.  For a discussion of this approach, see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., 
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7–32 (1969). 
 46 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 233–
36 (1962); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1321, 1339 (2001); John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2039 (2006) (“[B]y dividing the legislative process among three insti-
tutions answering to distinct constituencies, the bicameralism and presentment require-
ments . . . in effect create a supermajority requirement.”). 
 50 Michael B. Rappaport, Amending the Constitution to Establish Fiscal Supermajority Rules, 
13 J.L. & POL. 705, 712 (1997). 
 51 John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 75 
(2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity]. 
 52 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
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disproportionate power, relative to their populations, to defeat  
legislation.”53 
Furthermore, in our “particular brand of bicameralism,” each 
chamber of Congress represents not only different geographic but also 
different temporal constituencies.  Because members of the House are 
elected every two years,54 while members of the Senate serve six-year 
terms,55 each chamber responds at different rates to changing political 
winds.56  Even if a new political movement can gain sufficient momen-
tum to capture the House of Representatives, the movement may not 
be able to sustain such momentum long enough to gain a majority in 
the Senate.  Perhaps in part for that reason, “[m]any [measures] which 
would pass in the House will fail in the Senate.”57 
These bicameralism and presentment requirements have two im-
portant effects on the development of federal law.  First, they tend to 
favor the status quo by making federal legislation more difficult to 
enact.58  Furthermore, by imposing these supermajority requirements, 
the lawmaking procedures of Article I “unmistakably afford” political 
factions — even political minorities — “extraordinary power to block 
legislation.”59 
The Constitution also authorizes each chamber of Congress to sup-
plement these constitutional veto gates by setting “the Rules of its Pro-
ceedings.”60  Each chamber has invoked these rules to adopt proce-
dures that accentuate the protection of political minorities.61  For 
example, the House and Senate typically delegate matters to commit-
tees, whose members may not be representative of the views of the en-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 53 Manning, Equity, supra note 51, at 76. 
 54 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
 55 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 56 See Mark A. Graber, James Buchanan as Savior? Judicial Power, Political Fragmentation, 
and the Failed 1831 Repeal of Section 25, 88 OR. L. REV. 95, 152 (2009) (“The Presidency, Senate, 
and House react to the same external stimulus in different ways partly because . . . they are al-
ways likely to be moving at somewhat different speeds . . . .”). 
 57 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 49, at 247.  The presentment requirement adds an 
additional hurdle because the President represents a separate (national) constituency, which 
speaks every four years.  See id. at 248.  And, of course, in the event of a presidential veto, the 
text of the Constitution itself specifies the supermajority rule: an override by two-thirds of both 
the House and the Senate.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 58 See GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS 2, 37 (2002) (observing that, as the number of 
“veto players” increases, the likelihood of change from the status quo decreases); Clark, supra note 
49, at 1345–46. 
 59 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 77 
(2006). 
 60 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceed-
ings . . . .”). 
 61 See John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2016 (2009) (asserting that “the legislative procedures adopted by 
each House — including . . . committee gatekeeping[ and] the Senate filibuster [—] . . . enhance 
the protection of [political] minorities” in Congress). 
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tire body.62  These committees can often prevent (even popular) legisla-
tion from going to the House or Senate floor for a vote.  Furthermore, 
the Senate has established Rule 22, which allows one member to fili-
buster a bill, absent a cloture vote by three-fifths of the Senate (sixty 
members).63  Such rules create additional hurdles for legislation and 
thus give political factions alternative ways to veto their opponents’ 
proposals.64 
Although these lawmaking processes make enactment of any sort of 
federal legislation difficult, there is good reason to believe that they are 
especially effective at preventing restrictions on federal jurisdiction.  
Drawing on two strands of recent legal and social science literature, I 
argue that political factions are particularly likely to veto jurisdiction-
stripping legislation favored by their opponents. 
First, scholars have urged that an independent judiciary is more 
likely to flourish in a politically competitive society, like the United 
States.  In such a political system, risk-averse politicians favor an in-
dependent judiciary as a useful means of controlling their political op-
ponents during periods when their own side is out of power.65  Accord-
ingly, the faction in power will often adhere to an adverse judicial 
decision, with the expectation that its opponents will do the same 
when they are in control.66  Each political faction relies on the judi-
ciary as a long-term “check” on its political opponents. 
This system of “mutual cooperation” “resembles an indefinitely re-
peated Prisoner’s Dilemma,” with each side “implicitly agreeing to use 
cooperative strategies” to achieve some long-term objective (here, an 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 62 See John R. Boyce & Diane P. Bischak, The Role of Political Parties in the Organization of 
Congress, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 1–3 (2002) (noting the disagreement among political scientists 
over how much parties control committees and arguing that the majority party does not have 
“free rein” over committees, as it is “constrained by heterogeneity within its own party,” which 
allows the “minority party to influence” committees, id. at 3). 
 63 SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? 8 (1997). 
 64 See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee 
Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 89 (1987) (observing that “veto groups are pervasive in legis-
latures” and that “[a] small group of senators . . . may engage in filibuster and other forms of  
obstruction”). 
 65 See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 722, 741–42 (1994) (arguing that, in countries like the United States, 
“politicians offer independent courts” because “politicians in both parties expect the electoral sys-
tem to continue, but no one gives either party high odds of controlling the government indefinite-
ly,” id. at 722); Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . . ”: The Political Foundations 
of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 71–73 (2003). 
 66 See Ramseyer, supra note 65, at 741–42; Stephenson, supra note 65, at 63–64 (“[I]ndependent 
judicial review allows parties to minimize the risks associated with political competition.  Respect-
ing judicial independence may require the party that currently controls the government to sacri-
fice some policy objectives, but it also means that when that party is out of power, its opponent 
faces similar limitations.”). 
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independent judiciary).67  However, as Professor Mark Ramseyer has 
pointed out, “[p]arties to [such] indefinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilem-
mas do not necessarily cooperate.”68  Instead, in some contexts, the 
party in power may react to an adverse judicial decision by engaging 
in court-curbing efforts, like jurisdiction stripping.69  I contend that, in 
such instances, the opposing political faction has a strong incentive to 
veto that jurisdiction-stripping legislation to ensure that the judiciary 
can continue to “check” the actions of its political opponents. 
Second, social scientists who dub themselves scholars of “American 
Political Development” (APD)70 offer a set of arguments that further 
underscore why politicians may be inclined to veto jurisdiction-
stripping proposals.  APD scholars assert that, in our politically di-
vided society, the overall content of federal court decisions is generally 
favored by at least one major political faction.71  APD scholars have 
relied on this theory to explain why the political branches empower 
the judiciary (by, for example, expanding the size and jurisdiction of 
the courts)72 or defer matters to the judiciary.73  These scholars further 
argue that political leaders place “special importance”74 on empower-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 Ramseyer, supra note 65, at 742. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See sources cited infra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 70 See Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch, Introduction to THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1, 7–8 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006) [hereinafter 
THE SUPREME COURT] (describing the work of “scholars of American political development, or 
‘APD,’” id. at 7, as “large-scale historical studies” on “how [political] institutions structure their 
choices,” id. at 8). 
 71 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
18 (2007) (arguing that “[p]olitical actors defer to . . . courts because the judiciary can be useful to 
their own political and constitutional goals”); cf. Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: 
Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, STUD. AM. POL. DEV., Spring 1993, at 43 (urging that 
“politicians may facilitate judicial policymaking in part because they have good reason to believe 
that the courts will announce those policies they . . . favor”). 
 72 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 71, at 93 (asserting that “legislators can help constitute a 
programmatically friendly judiciary” “[b]y manipulating [its] size, structure, [and] jurisdiction”); 
Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal 
Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 512–13 (2002) (arguing that, 
in the late nineteenth century, the Republican Party expanded federal jurisdiction so that the 
courts could serve as “the principal agents of [the party’s economic] agenda,” id. at 513). 
 73 See Graber, supra note 71, at 36 (asserting that “when the dominant national coalition is 
unable or unwilling to settle some public dispute,” “prominent elected officials consciously invite 
the judiciary to resolve” the issue); Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Politi-
cal Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 583, 584 (2005) (urging that “[t]he establishment and maintenance of judicial re-
view is a way of delegating some kinds of political decisions to a relatively politically insulated 
institution”).  Notably, APD scholars recognize that this rationale for judicial independence does 
not mean that the federal courts are subservient to the political branches.  See WHITTINGTON, 
supra note 71, at 288 (noting that Supreme Court decisions cannot “be reduced to the political in-
terests of the party in power”). 
 74 Gillman, supra note 72, at 517. 
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ing the Supreme Court because its “decisions . . . establish the legal 
and ideological framework within which [the lower courts] operat[e].”75  
In short, APD scholars argue that at least one major political faction 
generally supports the judiciary.  I contend that this same faction 
should also have an incentive to veto jurisdiction-stripping proposals. 
Although it may seem surprising that the federal judiciary consis-
tently has the support of at least one major political faction, this his-
torical reality is largely a result of our constitutional structure.  The 
appointment and confirmation process established by the Constitution 
(requiring both presidential and senatorial approval) effectively guar-
antees that each federal judge has been selected by a dominant politi-
cal group.76  Thus, our process helps ensure that, at least at the outset, 
a judge’s views on constitutional and other legal issues align to some 
degree with those of political leaders.  Notably, as APD scholars con-
cede, the fact that judges are chosen by a dominant political faction 
does not mean that federal courts always issue decisions that accord 
with the views of that faction.77  But this political group does tend to 
support the overall content of federal court decisions.  The selection 
process of Article II thus gives a major political faction an incentive to 
support the relatively “friendly” judiciary that it put in place. 
For example, in the late nineteenth century, economic nationalists 
in the Republican Party sought to use the judiciary to advance their 
pro-business economic goals.  Accordingly, this faction used its control 
over the Presidency and the Senate to appoint judges who were likely 
to be sympathetic to the concerns of large corporations.  And when 
this faction had sufficient political support in Congress, it sought to 
expand the size of the federal judiciary and the scope of federal juris-
diction.78  In the mid- to late twentieth century, social progressives 
(primarily in the Democratic Party) sought to use the judiciary to ad-
vance progressive goals, such as racial civil rights.  Accordingly, pro-
gressive Presidents appointed judges who seemed likely to issue deci-
sions that would accord with progressive values.79  And the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 75 Id. at 518. 
 76 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] . . . shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other 
Officers of the United States . . . .”).  The Constitution does not expressly state that inferior federal 
court judges are “principal” officers who must be appointed in this manner.  But that has been 
our practice to date. 
 77 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 71, at 288 (noting that Supreme Court decisions can-
not “be reduced to the political interests of the party in power”).  For example, although progres-
sive legislators in the mid- to late twentieth century generally supported the civil liberties juris-
prudence of the Warren Court, they did not agree with all of the Court’s rulings.  Indeed, several 
of the Court’s criminal justice decisions had little political support.  See id. at 159. 
 78 See infra Part III, pp. 888–899. 
 79 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 71, at 126–34 (discussing how the Roosevelt and Truman 
Administrations sought to defer racial civil rights to the judiciary and then the Kennedy Adminis-
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Department of Justice under progressive Presidents filed briefs en-
couraging the courts to issue such “favorable” decisions.80 
Notably, these political factions had a particularly strong incentive 
to appoint jurists to the Supreme Court who were sympathetic to their 
views.  The Court has the power to “establish the legal and ideological 
framework within which [the lower courts] . . . operat[e].”81  Thus, to 
the extent that these political factions sought to advance their goals 
through the judiciary, they could most effectively do so if they had the 
support of the Supreme Court. 
As these examples illustrate, a political faction often seeks to em-
power the judiciary during periods when its side is in control.  This 
dynamic has an important impact on that faction’s political incentives 
once it is no longer in power.  These supporters of the judiciary have a 
strong incentive to veto jurisdiction-stripping legislation that could 
undermine the authority of this “friendly” judiciary. 
Social scientists and legal scholars argue that the above political in-
centives (that is, ongoing political competition and the support of a 
major political faction) are necessary conditions for the empowerment 
and long-term maintenance of an independent judiciary.82  But, as 
these scholars themselves suggest, these political incentives are not suf-
ficient short-term protections for federal jurisdiction, especially if the 
political faction in power opposes the judiciary.83 
I argue that the lawmaking requirements of Article I provide a cru-
cial structural safeguard.  These procedures give the political faction 
supporting the judiciary — even if it is only a political minority — 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
tration sought to defer the issue of reapportionment); Howard Gillman, Party Politics and Consti-
tutional Change: The Political Origins of Liberal Judicial Activism, in THE SUPREME COURT, 
supra note 70, at 138, 140, 146–55, 158 (asserting that the “modern judicial liberalism” of the War-
ren Court and post–Warren Court era “can be traced to the self-conscious efforts of Democratic 
Party officeholders in the 1960s,” id. at 140, because the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations 
sought to appoint judges who would favor civil rights and other progressive causes and thereby 
“set in motion an important constitutional legacy,” id. at 158). 
 80 See Gillman, supra note 79, at 153; WHITTINGTON, supra note 71, at 126–27, 129, 132–33. 
 81 Gillman, supra note 72, at 518. 
 82 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 71, at 4 (“For constitutions and institutions like judicial 
review to exist in historical reality . . . , there must be political reasons for powerful political actors 
to support them over time.”); Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment 
Through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 91, 116 (2000) (arguing that political leaders will empower the judiciary only if they 
have “a sufficient level of certainty . . . that the judiciary in general and the supreme court in par-
ticular are likely to produce decisions that . . . reflect their ideological preferences”); Ramseyer, 
supra note 65, at 722 (urging that independent courts are unlikely to flourish in a system that 
lacks sustained political competition). 
 83 See Ramseyer, supra note 65, at 742 (stating that, even in a politically competitive society, 
the political strategies that protect the judiciary are “fragile” because politicians “might agree to 
insulate their courts.  Then again, they might not”); Whittington, supra note 73, at 585 (noting 
that the Supreme Court may espouse “constitutional understandings . . . not shared by political 
leaders” and that “[i]f the obstruction is . . . serious, . . . the political reaction might be . . . severe”). 
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multiple opportunities to veto jurisdiction-stripping legislation favored 
by its opponents.  The constitutional structure thus gives supporters of 
the judiciary the tools to do what they are already inclined to do: pro-
tect the federal judiciary that they sought to empower. 
This structural argument (as discussed below in Parts III and IV) 
has considerable historical support.  In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, economic nationalists in the Republican Party re-
peatedly used their structural veto in the Senate (along with procedur-
al tools like the filibuster) to block efforts to restrict federal jurisdiction 
over suits involving corporations.  In more recent times, social progres-
sives (primarily in the Democratic Party) have used their veto points in 
both the House and the Senate (along with procedural tools like com-
mittee blockage) to preserve federal jurisdiction over constitutional 
claims.  Furthermore, supporters of the judiciary have been especially 
inclined to veto attempts to strip the Supreme Court’s appellate juris-
diction in order to preserve the Court’s “special” role in “estab-
lish[ing] . . . the legal . . . framework”84 for the lower federal and state 
courts. 
Thus, the historical evidence seems to support my contention that, 
although the Article I lawmaking process makes it difficult to enact 
any legislation, it is especially hard to enact jurisdiction-stripping pro-
posals.  The Article II appointment process gives political factions an 
opportunity to “invest” in the judiciary and to construct a judiciary 
that will issue favorable decisions.  These supporters of the judiciary 
then have a strong incentive to use their structural veto in the House 
or in the Senate to protect the scope of federal jurisdiction.85 
At the outset, however, I should note some qualifications and clari-
fications about this argument.  First, I do not claim that these struc-
tural safeguards block all efforts to strip federal jurisdiction.  As dis-
cussed below (in Part V), political actors have managed on rare 
occasions to assemble the supermajority necessary to enact jurisdic-
tion-stripping legislation.  I assert only that the Article I lawmaking 
process offers a strong (and previously unrecognized) protection for the 
federal courts. 
Furthermore, although my argument focuses on the structural safe-
guards of Article I, I do not mean to suggest that Article III is irrele-
vant to debates over federal jurisdiction.  On the contrary, I assert that 
these lawmaking procedures help protect a constitutional principle 
based in Article III: that Congress should give the federal courts suffi-
cient jurisdiction to exercise the Article III judicial power.  Nor do I 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 84 Gillman, supra note 72, at 518. 
 85 The same incentives may also lead supporters of the judiciary to oppose other court-curbing 
measures.  But full consideration of that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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assert that the legislators who oppose jurisdiction-stripping legislation 
do so only for political reasons, without regard to these Article III val-
ues.  I do not doubt that many legislators vote against jurisdiction-
stripping bills in part out of a conviction that such proposals “violate 
the spirit of the Constitution, even if [they do] not violate its letter.”86  
I do assert, however, that the political incentives of legislators help en-
sure that they vote in accordance with that constitutional judgment. 
I also want to clarify that I do not contend that every constitutional 
principle can be adequately enforced through the lawmaking processes 
of Article I.  My argument here depends on the fact that, throughout 
our history, the overall content of federal court decisions has had the 
support of a major political faction.  This historical reality (which, as 
discussed, is tied to the constitutional structure)87 ensures that at least 
one major political faction has an incentive to veto jurisdiction-
stripping legislation.  I argue that our constitutional structure gives 
that political group the tools to exercise such a veto — even when the 
faction is only a minority in Congress. 
Notably, this account of federal jurisdiction accords with the origi-
nal purpose of our constitutional scheme of separated powers.  The bi-
cameralism and presentment procedures of Article I were expressly  
designed to channel — and thereby curtail — the influence of “fac-
tions.”88  As Professor Larry Kramer has recounted, James Madison 
understood at the Founding that the nation was replete with diverse 
regional and political groups.89  “The key to making the Constitution 
work lay in finding a way to harness these [competing] political inter-
ests . . . by using constitutional authority granted to the institutions in 
which the officials worked, for the benefit of constitutional enforce-
ment.”90  In this context, the bicameralism and presentment processes 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 86 Bator, supra note 15, at 1039; see also Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution 
Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 69, 83 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009) (as-
serting that Congress may be enforcing a “customary norm” against jurisdiction stripping).  
 87 See sources cited supra notes 70–81 and accompanying text.  I am not aware of historical 
evidence suggesting that political leaders have a similar inclination to protect, for example, the 
Bill of Rights provisions addressing the rights of criminal defendants — although politicians may 
indirectly safeguard those rights by preserving federal jurisdiction.  See supra note 77 (noting that, 
although the Warren Court’s jurisprudence generally found favor with progressive Democrats, 
several of the Court’s criminal justice decisions had little political support). 
 88 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF 
A PARTY SYSTEM 50 (1969) (“[F]or the Fathers [the] checks [on power] had to be built into the 
constitutional structure itself.  They were not content . . . to rest their hopes on . . . the political 
process alone . . . .”). 
 89 See Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 632 (1999); sources cited 
infra note 94 (noting some of those regional differences). 
 90 Larry D. Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, 
and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 727 (2006). 
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of Article I have repeatedly harnessed these competing interests to  
safeguard the Article III judicial power. 
III.  STRUCTURAL VETO POINTS IN POST–CIVIL WAR AMERICA 
From 1789 until the Civil War, the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
was governed — with few modifications — by the Judiciary Act of 
1789.91  As Professor Charles Warren has observed, this statute was a 
compromise among the competing political forces of the day.92  
Throughout the antebellum period, the locus of political competition 
was between “nationalists” who favored a more robust federal gov-
ernment and “states’ rights advocates” who wished to leave matters to 
the states.93  There were also cross-cutting political disputes among the 
several states.94  These competing political factions seemed to agree on 
the need for Supreme Court review of state court decisions.95  But 
there was far less political consensus on the need for, or the utility of, 
inferior federal courts.96  Ultimately, these competing factions settled 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 91 See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 
HARV. L. REV. 49, 131 (1923). 
 92 See id. at 53; infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.  Notably, throughout this Article, 
for the party affiliation of members of Congress, I rely on Congress’s online database,  
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/ 
biosearch.asp (last visited  Jan. 8, 2011). 
 93 See GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS 2–4, 252, 268–69 (2002).   
 94 There were divisions among small and large states, see Bradford R. Clark, Federal Law-
making and the Role of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 703 
(2008), between slave and free states, see MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 92 (2006), and between agrarian and commercial interests (and  
debtors and creditors) within states, see BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS 166–82 
(2002). 
 95 Nationalists were worried that state courts might interfere with the operations of the new 
government.  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 798 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. 
William Loughton Smith, Pro-Admin., S.C.) (urging that it was “indispensable” to have an appeal 
to the Supreme Court from every state court decision involving federal law).  States’ rights advo-
cates hoped that the Court would keep the national government within its prescribed bounds and 
also police the actions of sister states.  See, e.g., id. at 809 (statement of Rep. Michael Stone, Anti-
Admin., Md.) (asserting that “those who framed” “the scheme of the present Government” “sup-
posed that it had a natural tendency to destroy the State Governments; or, on the other hand, they 
supposed that the State Governments had a tendency to abridge the powers of the General Gov-
ernment; therefore it was necessary to guard against either taking place, and this was to be done 
properly by establishing a Judiciary for the United States” — the “Supreme Federal Court”).  
 96 See Warren, supra note 91, at 67 (reporting that the “crucial contest” was over the scope of 
inferior federal jurisdiction).  Nationalists favored such a lower federal court system to ensure the 
proper enforcement and administration of federal law.  See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 806–07 
(1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Fisher Ames, Pro-Admin., Mass.) (urging that 
lower federal courts were necessary).  States’ rights advocates insisted that state courts could 
handle most federal matters, especially since their decisions would be subject to Supreme Court 
review.  See, e.g., id. at 831 (statement of Rep. James Jackson, R-Ga.) (arguing that “the check 
furnished by the Supreme Court[], to revise and correct [state court] judgments” would be  
“sufficient”). 
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on a compromise measure that placed the bulk of federal jurisdiction 
in the Supreme Court and established a limited set of lower federal 
courts with jurisdiction only over matters that seemed outside the pur-
view of a particular state, such as admiralty and federal criminal law.97 
This political compromise on the scope of federal jurisdiction re-
mained fairly stable throughout the antebellum period.  Notably, this 
early period seems to accord with the contention of social scientists 
and legal scholars that an independent judiciary can flourish only in a 
politically competitive system and only when it has some political sup-
port.  The competing factions of this era agreed on a limited amount of 
inferior federal court jurisdiction (largely because the states’ rights ad-
vocates opposed a large federal judiciary).98  By contrast, all the fac-
tions (even the states’ rights advocates) favored Supreme Court review 
to resolve disputes among the several states and between the national 
and state governments.99  The scope of jurisdiction under the 1789 Act 
reflected this political consensus. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 97 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86 (authorizing Supreme Court review 
of any state court decision arising under federal law when the state court denied a federal right); 
id. §§ 2–4, 9, 11, 1 Stat. at 73–79 (creating thirteen district courts and six circuit courts — which 
would be staffed by district court judges and Supreme Court Justices riding circuit — and giving 
the courts jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases, suits arising under international or fed-
eral criminal law, and diversity actions when the amount in controversy exceeded $500); see also 
Warren, supra note 91, at 67–68 (noting that states’ rights advocates were forced to “yield” and 
permit some limited jurisdiction in the lower federal courts).  The Act gave the Supreme Court 
some authority to oversee the lower federal courts.  See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 13–14, 
22, 1 Stat. at 80–82, 84–85 (permitting the Court to review federal appeals when the amount in 
controversy exceeded $2000 and to issue writs of prohibition, mandamus, and habeas corpus); 
Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 37, at 1488–90 (noting that the Court’s habeas juris-
diction allowed it to review federal criminal cases). 
 98 See supra note 96.  There was one (short-lived) effort to expand inferior federal court juris-
diction.  Following the election of 1800, the outgoing Federalist Congress enacted the Midnight 
Judges Act, which greatly expanded the size and jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and 
ended circuit riding by Supreme Court Justices.  See Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, §§ 11, 27, 2 Stat. 
89, 92, 98.  However, the incoming Republican Congress quickly repealed the statute and resur-
rected the system established by the 1789 Judiciary Act.  See Repeal Act, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 
132 (1802); Kathryn Turner, Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 
3, 32 (1965).  Notably, this event supports the argument of social scientists that political support is 
a necessary condition of judicial independence.  There was, of course, some support for lower 
court jurisdiction, since the Republicans restored the courts’ authority under the 1789 Act.  But 
no major political faction supported the jurisdictional expansion.  (The Federalist Party did not 
prove to be a major political faction; the party was crippled by its defeat in 1800 and was “all but 
defunct” by the end of the War of 1812.  LEONARD, supra note 93, at 35.)  As noted in the text, I 
assume that such political support is a necessary condition of judicial independence.  Absent such 
support, there will be no major political faction to exercise the veto created by the lawmaking 
processes of Article I and, accordingly, those processes cannot prevent jurisdiction stripping — as 
the 1802 repeal itself illustrates. 
 99 See supra note 95.  During the nineteenth century, there were occasional proposals to re-
strict the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, but no such measure gained traction in Con-
gress.  The most significant challenge occurred in 1831, when the House Judiciary Committee 
recommended that Congress repeal section 25 of the 1789 Act (the provision authorizing Supreme 
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For the purposes of this Article, I assume that such political sup-
port is a necessary condition for the establishment and maintenance of 
an independent judiciary.  But even proponents of this theory do not 
contend that it is a sufficient condition for judicial independence.100  
As Professor Ramseyer has pointed out, such a system of “implicit co-
operation” among competing political factions is “fragile at best.”101  
“Parties to [these] indefinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas do not 
necessarily cooperate. . . . They might agree to insulate their courts.  
Then again, they might not.”102 
Our constitutional structure offers an additional “check” that helps 
to preserve the federal judicial power.  The Article I process of bicam-
eralism and presentment requires a supermajority to pass any piece of 
legislation and thus allows political factions — even political minori-
ties — to veto legislation favored by their opponents.  These veto 
points, as discussed below (and in Part IV), became increasingly im-
portant in the post-Reconstruction era and have remained crucial in 
the present day. 
A.  Jurisdictional Battle: Suits Involving Corporations 
The first sustained set of jurisdiction-stripping attempts occurred in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (following a signifi-
cant jurisdictional expansion).103  During this period, the federal judi-
ciary was viewed as biased in favor of big business and, accordingly, 
populists and progressives (primarily in the Democratic Party) re-
peatedly sought to restrict federal jurisdiction over suits involving  
corporations. 
The fate of these jurisdiction-stripping bills vividly illustrates the 
roadblocks created by the Article I lawmaking process.  Although 
these measures consistently passed the House of Representatives, the 
proposals were always defeated in the Senate — largely due to the ef-
forts of economic nationalists within the Republican Party, who sup-
ported the judiciary’s pro-business decisions.  This faction dominated 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Court review of state court decisions).  See 7 REG. DEB. app. at lxxvii (1831) (Report upon the 
Judiciary).  The House of Representatives, however, overwhelmingly rejected the bill by a vote of 
138–51 — without even holding a debate.  See id. at 542; Charles Warren, Legislative and Judi-
cial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States — A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section 
of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 161, 163–64 (1913) (discussing the proposal).  It does not ap-
pear that any other proposal to strip the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction even went to a 
vote in either chamber of Congress.  See 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN 
UNITED STATES HISTORY 55–58 (1922) (discussing unsuccessful jurisdiction-stripping efforts in 
response to the Court’s decisions upholding the fugitive slave laws). 
 100 See supra p. 885. 
 101 Ramseyer, supra note 65, at 742. 
 102 Id. 
 103 The single effort to strip the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in 1868 is discussed be-
low in section V.B.2, pp. 922–27. 
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the Republican Party in the late nineteenth century and, accordingly, 
as long as the party controlled the Senate, had ample power to block 
the Democrats’ jurisdiction-stripping efforts.  Later on, in the early 
twentieth century, the Progressive movement gained strength in both 
political parties, and the economic nationalists became a smaller fac-
tion within their own party.  Nevertheless, this faction — even when it 
was a political minority in Congress — successfully used its structural 
veto points (and procedural tools, like the filibuster) to protect federal 
jurisdiction. 
1.  Establishing the Battleground: The Jurisdictional Expansion of 
1875. — In the late nineteenth century, the major political parties were 
internally cohesive and reasonably united in pursuing their political 
agendas.104  For the Republicans, that agenda focused on economic na-
tionalism.105  The party thus appealed to corporate interests, particu-
larly in the Northeast, that supported national economic policies and 
opposed state restrictions on corporations (such as the “Granger laws” 
that limited the rates that railroads could charge consumers106).  The 
Democrats, by contrast, were largely supported by agrarian and rural 
voters in the South and the West.107  They opposed many of the Re-
publicans’ national economic policies and argued that each state had 
the right to regulate corporations doing business within its territory.108 
Political science professor Howard Gillman argues that the expan-
sion of federal jurisdiction was part and parcel of the Republicans’ 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 104 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 71, at 255–56 (observing that “[n]ational legislators in the 
late nineteenth century displayed substantial party discipline, and the divisions between the two 
parties were stark”); William Nisbet Chambers, Party Development and the American Main-
stream, in THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS 14 (William Nisbet Chambers & Walter Dean 
Burnham eds., 1967) (stating that, from 1865 until the early 1890s, the United States was in its 
“third party system,” which was highlighted by strong party loyalties and unprecedented turnout 
in presidential elections). 
 105 See Gillman, supra note 72, at 516.  As various scholars have recounted, in the immediate 
aftermath of the Civil War, the Republican Party focused more on civil rights.  To protect free 
blacks in the South, the Reconstruction Republicans enacted several civil rights statutes and sig-
nificantly expanded the federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction to enforce those new laws (along with 
the new protections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).  See William M. Wiecek, The 
Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863–1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333, 344 (1969).  
However, the political support for federal civil rights enforcement waned in the 1870s, and the 
Republicans turned instead toward building a strong national economy.  See Gillman, supra note 
72, at 516. 
 106 See JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 86–87 (2001) (discussing 
“Granger laws” in Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, which were viewed “with dismay” by 
“[r]ailroads and eastern investors,” id. at 87). 
 107 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY 15 (1992) (asserting that, 
during this period, the Democrats represented interests in the Midwest, West, and South that were 
increasingly “hostil[e] to eastern financial interests and national corporations”).  I do not mean to 
suggest that there were no “business conservatives” in the Democratic Party.  See infra note 115.  
But the party seems to have been heavily supported by agrarian and rural voters. 
 108 See Gillman, supra note 72, at 516. 
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economic agenda.109  Federal courts were viewed as a favorable forum 
for large corporations.110  Because federal judges were appointed, rath-
er than elected, they were less susceptible than state judges to anti-
corporate local sentiments.111  Moreover, under the doctrine of Swift v. 
Tyson,112 federal courts could (and often did) apply “a nationally uni-
form common law”113 in commercial cases, thereby helping to ensure 
that corporations were not subject to different standards in different 
states.114  Republicans also controlled the Presidency and the Senate 
during much of the late nineteenth century and were thus able to ap-
point judges who were generally sympathetic to the party’s national 
economic agenda.115  Finally, corporate defendants favored federal 
court procedures, which gave federal judges more control over local 
juries (who might be sympathetic to plaintiffs in suits against large 
corporations) and required the twelve-person jury to be unanimous.116 
Professor Gillman further argues that Supreme Court supervision 
of these lower federal courts was “[o]f special importance in fortifying 
[the Republicans’ national economic] agenda.”117  Although “[t]he jus-
tices would not have the day-to-day responsibilities of administering 
this policy in individual cases, . . . their decisions would establish the 
legal and ideological framework within which [the inferior federal 
court judges] would be operating.”118 
The Republicans controlled both chambers of Congress and the 
Presidency throughout the early 1870s.119  But they did not succeed in 
enacting any significant judicial reform until they were about to lose 
(at least part of) that political control.  In the 1874 elections, the Dem-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 109 Id. at 513, 516–17 (arguing that “the main purpose of the Judiciary and Removal Act of 
1875 was to redirect civil litigation involving national commercial interests out of state courts and 
into the federal judiciary,” id. at 516–17, so that federal judges could serve as “the principal agents 
of [the Republicans’ economic] agenda,” id. at 513). 
 110 BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 154–55 (2009). 
 111 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 24. 
 112 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that federal courts in diversity cases were not bound by 
state common law). 
 113 PURCELL, supra note 107, at 24. 
 114 Id. at 23–24. 
 115 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 110, at 159–60; see also PURCELL, supra note 107, at 25 (ob-
serving that “[f]ederal judges . . . were more frequently chosen from the ranks of prominent and 
successful corporation attorneys,” who were “disposed . . . [to] more readily sympathize with 
the . . . arguments that national corporations advanced”).  Moreover, the only Democrat who con-
trolled the Presidency during this period (Grover Cleveland) was a “business conservative.”  Pres-
ident Cleveland also tended to select judges who were sympathetic to pro-business concerns.  See 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 71, at 213; Gillman, supra note 72, at 517. 
 116 PURCELL, supra note 107, at 24. 
 117 Gillman, supra note 72, at 517. 
 118 Id. at 518. 
 119 See 5 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, MILLENNIAL EDITION ON-
LINE 5-201 (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter HISTORICAL STATISTICS]. 
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ocrats captured the House of Representatives.120  Following that elec-
tion, but before the actual transfer of political power, the Republicans 
passed a sweeping jurisdictional statute.121 
The Judiciary Act of 1875122 completely transformed the jurisdic-
tional scheme created in 1789.  The statute allowed the federal courts 
to hear all cases arising under federal law123 and significantly ex-
panded their jurisdiction in diversity suits, including by adding oppor-
tunities to remove cases from state to federal court.124  This expansion 
of federal jurisdiction was a major policy achievement for the Repub-
lican Party and a major source of irritation for the Democrats.  The 
1875 Act thus precipitated a bitter partisan struggle over federal  
jurisdiction. 
2.  Jurisdiction-Stripping Efforts: 1875–1890. — The 1875 Judiciary 
Act led to an explosion in federal litigation.125  Corporations, particu-
larly railroads and insurance companies, took advantage of their op-
portunities to remove cases from state to federal court.126  And they 
were helped in this endeavor by Supreme Court jurisprudence.  The 
Court had previously adopted an irrebuttable presumption that a cor-
poration was a citizen only of the state in which it was incorporated (a 
legal rule that enhanced the opportunities for removal, especially after 
1875).127  The Court also invalidated state laws that sought to stem the 
tide of removal.  For example, a few states, including Wisconsin and 
Iowa, enacted statutes providing that out-of-state corporations could 
do business within the state only if they agreed to waive their right to 
remove common law actions to federal court.  The Supreme Court 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 120 See id. (showing that, after the 1874 elections, the Democrats had a 169–109 majority in the 
House). 
 121 See Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.  The Act was signed on March 3, 1875.  See 
3 CONG. REC. 2275 (1875); Gillman, supra note 72, at 516 (observing that, “in the wake of the 
midterm elections of 1874, where Democrats regained control of the House . . . , Republican lead-
ers in 1875 quickly” sought to enact the legislation). 
 122 Ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. 
 123 Id. § 1, 18 Stat. at 470 (conferring jurisdiction over “all suits . . . arising under” the federal 
Constitution, laws, and treaties when the amount in controversy exceeded $500). 
 124 See id. §§ 1–2, 18 Stat. at 470–71. 
 125 See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 65 (1928); PURCELL, supra note 107, at 15. 
 126 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 20 (noting that, according to an 1876 House report, 
“[d]iversity suits were ‘the largest and most rapidly-increasing class of Federal cases,’” and that 
most such litigation consisted of suits against railroads and insurance companies); Wiecek, supra 
note 105, at 342 (noting that, after 1875, “removal was quickly and enthusiastically resorted to by 
railroads and other interstate corporations”). 
 127 See Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1854) (holding that 
stockholders of a corporation are presumed to be citizens of the corporation’s state of incorpora-
tion); Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844) 
(holding that a corporation created by a state is a citizen of that state).  Corporations also took 
advantage of this legal rule by incorporating in states with favorable incorporation laws, such as 
New Jersey and Delaware.  See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 19. 
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struck down those laws, stating that “[t]he Constitution of the United 
States secures to citizens of another state . . . an absolute right to re-
move their cases into . . . Federal court, upon compliance with the 
terms of the removal statute.”128 
The Democrats were, as a whole, highly critical of the 1875 Act 
and the Supreme Court decisions that facilitated it.  Accordingly, they 
sought to undo the Court’s rulings by legislation.129  For several dec-
ades, Democratic legislators in the House of Representatives proposed 
bills that would curb federal jurisdiction over suits involving corpora-
tions.  Representative David Culberson led the charge in the late 1870s 
and the 1880s.130  He repeatedly proposed legislation that would define 
a corporation as a citizen of any state in which it did business and  
thereby largely eliminate federal diversity jurisdiction over common 
law actions involving corporations.131 
The debates over this legislation reflected the partisan divides of 
the period.  In support of the jurisdiction-stripping bills, Representa-
tive Culberson and others emphasized in part the challenges that their 
poorer constituents faced in federal litigation against large corpora-
tions.132  But they also took aim at the Supreme Court decisions inva-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 128 Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186, 198 (1887); see id. at 197–98, 200 (invalidating an Iowa 
law that required corporations to waive their right to remove cases to federal court); Home Ins. 
Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 458 (1874) (invalidating a similar Wisconsin law). 
 129 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 15 (“Beginning in 1878, southerners and their allies [in the 
Midwest and the West] mounted a persistent campaign to restrict the federal courts, prevent cor-
porate removals, and limit diversity jurisdiction.”).  Notably, these proposals did attract some 
(modest) Republican support.  See infra note 139. 
 130 See 15 CONG. REC. 118 (1883); 13 CONG. REC. 427 (1882); 10 CONG. REC. 43 (1879); 7 
CONG. REC. 4000 (1878). 
 131 See 10 CONG. REC. 681–82 (1880).  The legislation provided: 
That the circuit courts of the United States shall not take original cognizance of any 
suit . . . between a corporation created or organized by or under the laws of any State 
and a citizen of any State in which such corporation at the time the cause of action ac-
crued may have been carrying on any business . . . except in like cases in which said 
courts are authorized by this act to take original cognizance of suits between citizens of 
the same State.  Nor shall any such suit . . . be removed to any circuit court of the Unit-
ed States . . . . 
Id. at 682.  Later versions of the bill were virtually identical but also specified that the jurisdic-
tional limitation would not apply to pending cases or to cases arising under the copyright or pa-
tent laws.  See 24 CONG. REC. 217 (1892); 15 CONG. REC. 4879 (1884); 14 CONG. REC. 1244 
(1883). 
 132 See 10 CONG. REC. 702 (1880) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.) (“Persons who 
are poor and without the means to litigate with wealthy corporations are . . . denied justice [in 
federal court].  They are unable to prosecute their causes, and, tired out with delays, surrender 
their claims for such pittance as may be offered in compromise.”); see also PURCELL, supra note 
107, at 27 (“[R]emoval often gave corporations a dramatically increased ability to exploit their so-
cial and economic power when confronting relatively weak individual litigants.  An ordinary suit 
heard in a federal court was or could easily become far more burdensome and expensive than it 
would have been if heard in a state court.”).  Some representatives recounted compelling stories: 
A citizen of my own county was killed by a railroad train.  He was a laboring-man with 
a large family, earning his living by his daily toil.  There was little question in my mind, 
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lidating state restrictions on removal.133  For example, Representative 
James Knott observed that “[a] number of the States . . . endeavored to 
correct this most unjust and oppressive [corporate] evil,” but their ef-
forts were “in vain; for the Supreme Court . . . declared [those laws] 
void for repugnance to the Constitution.”134  Likewise, Representative 
Benton McMillin described the Court’s holdings as “a barrier over 
which no State Legislature or State constitution can pass . . . .  The 
people . . . cry out for relief.  There is but one tribunal on earth which 
can give it to them, and that is the Congress of the United States.”135 
In response, the Republicans defended the federal judiciary and 
emphasized its importance to national economic growth and develop-
ment.136  For example, Representative George Robinson argued that, 
given the populist developments in some states, such as the “granger 
laws and granger excitements [in the West],” corporations could not 
trust partisan state judicial systems to adjudicate their claims.137  
Likewise, Representative Hiram Barber urged that “[c]apital [in the 
North and East] is timid; it demands security” and the “best guarantee 
of security to investments [is] found in recourse to the national 
courts.”138 
These jurisdiction-stripping bills repeatedly passed the House of 
Representatives.139  Each time, however, the legislation was defeated 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
having investigated the facts, of the liability of the railroad company.  His widow 
brought suit in the State court, but the railroad being a foreign corporation made appli-
cation for removal, and the case was sent to the Federal court.  This had the effect to 
close the doors of justice to this widow and her children.  She was unable to attend or to 
pay the expenses of attending the Federal court held at a distance of a hundred miles 
from the place where the injury was inflicted. 
10 CONG. REC. 725 (1880) (statement of Rep. James Weaver, Greenbacker-Iowa). 
 133 See 15 CONG. REC. app. at 363 (1884) (statement of Rep. Richard Townshend, D-Ill.) 
(“Th[e] encroachment of the Federal judiciary is so far-reaching in its effects they have declared 
that a State is powerless to deprive a corporation of this right of removal, even where the corpora-
tions have made an agreement to waive the privilege.”). 
 134 10 CONG. REC. 951 (1880) (statement of Rep. James Knott, D-Ky.). 
 135 Id. at 818 (statement of Rep. Benton McMillin, D-Tenn.). 
 136 See id. at 850 (statement of Rep. George Robinson, R-Mass.) (arguing that, given the impor-
tance of the federal courts for economic disputes, “let us stand by the national courts; let us pre-
serve their power”); see also 15 CONG. REC. app. at 279 (1884) (speech of Rep. Horatio Bisbee, 
Jr., R-Fla.) (asserting that the Culberson bill “is designed to accomplish what the Supreme Court 
decided a State by its legislation could not accomplish,” and therefore “is as plainly repugnant to 
the Constitution” as the state law). 
 137 10 CONG. REC. 850 (1880) (statement of Rep. George Robinson, R-Mass.); see ELY, supra 
note 106, at 86–87 (noting that railroads and eastern investors opposed state “Granger laws,” 
which limited the rates that railroads could charge consumers). 
 138 10 CONG. REC. 820 (1880) (statement of Rep. Hiram Barber, Jr., R-Ill.). 
 139 In 1880, the bill passed the House by a vote of 162–74.  Id. at 1305.  In 1883, it passed by a 
vote of 134–67.  14 CONG. REC. 1254 (1883); infra Appendix, p. 934 (showing the breakdown of 
votes in 1880 and 1883).  In 1884, the bill passed without a recorded vote.  15 CONG. REC. 4879 
(1884).  Notably, these bills passed not only when the Democratic Party controlled the House.  In 
1883, the Republicans had a slight majority in the House, see HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra 
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in the Republican-controlled Senate.  The economic nationalists at that 
time dominated their (unified) party and thus dominated the Senate, 
rendering it very receptive to “appeals . . . from manufacturers[ and] 
business organizations” about the importance of preserving a federal 
forum for corporations.140  Accordingly, once each bill made its way to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, “it never emerged.”141 
In 1890, Representative Culberson complained: 
  Since I have been in Congress I have labored, in season and out of 
season, to improve the Federal judicial system and to relieve the people of 
the several States of the wrong and oppression and inconvenience result-
ing from it . . . . 
  I have advocated the withdrawal of jurisdiction from the Federal 
courts of controversies [involving] corporations . . . . I have had the satis-
faction of passing such a measure through the House of Representatives in 
four Congresses . . . . [B]ut the fate of the measure in the Senate heretofore 
warns us that it can never become the law.142 
Thus, as Professor Gillman has observed, “[r]epeal [of the 1875 leg-
islation] was avoided throughout this formative period” of 1875–1890 
“because Republicans maintained a political veto over such efforts by 
holding onto at least one institution of the national government.”143 
B.  Jurisdiction Stripping in a Changing Party System: 1891–1912 
In 1891, during another period of unified government (and follow-
ing a bitter partisan fight), the Republicans enacted a second reform to 
strengthen the federal judiciary.144  The Circuit Court of Appeals Act 
of 1891145 established nine courts of appeals and gave the Supreme 
Court discretionary review via writs of certiorari over certain types of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
note 119, at 5-201 (showing a 147–135 Republican majority), but not enough to block the legis-
lation.  The jurisdiction-stripping bill gained the support of a sufficient number of Republican  
legislators to pass the House by a vote of 134–67.  See 14 CONG. REC. 1254 (1883).  There were 
135 House Democrats at the time, who overwhelmingly supported the legislation.  Not a single 
Democrat voted against the bill.  But forty Democrats did not vote on the bill (a seemingly com-
mon occurrence during that era — perhaps a result of transportation difficulties).  The Democrats 
thus had to rely on some Republican support.  See infra Appendix, p. 934. 
 140 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 125, at 92; see WHITTINGTON, supra note 71, at 
98 (“In the late nineteenth century, the Republican-controlled Senate was the graveyard of Demo-
cratic proposals to retrench federal jurisdiction.”). 
 141 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 125, at 90 n.154; see id. at 91 nn.155–56. 
 142 21 CONG. REC. 3405–06 (1890) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.). 
 143 Gillman, supra note 72, at 521. 
 144 See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 125, at 89, 93 (noting that, in the late 1870s and 
1880s, “[t]he two houses were deadlocked. . . . After the Davis Bill [to restructure the federal judi-
ciary] passed the Senate, it was buried in the House Judiciary Committee,” id. at 93); Gillman, 
supra note 72, at 521 (observing that the final version of the statute was enacted by a “lame-duck” 
Republican-controlled Congress, just before the Democrats retook the House of Representatives). 
 145 Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
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cases from the newly created appellate courts.146  This legislation was 
designed to give the federal judiciary sufficient personnel and  
resources to handle the additional duties created by the 1875 Act, so  
that “the 1875 jurisdictional changes [could] persist” into the next  
century.147 
The Democrats soon took back the House of Representatives, how-
ever, and continued to press for restrictions on federal jurisdiction.  
Representative Culberson, and then other members of the House,148 
repeatedly introduced legislation to curb jurisdiction over suits involv-
ing corporations.149  During the 1890s, these bills (as before) fared well 
in the House, passing that body on several occasions.150  But, once 
again, each bill “found its way to the Senate morgue.”151  In 1894, 
Representative Culberson again lamented that, although the proposal 
had passed the House in multiple Congresses, that body had never 
“been able to get the concurrence of the Senate in this measure.”152 
After the turn of the century, however, the prospects for this legisla-
tion appeared to be much more promising.  In the early 1900s, the 
Progressive movement gained strength in both political parties,153 and 
the Republican Party was soon divided between the (once dominant) 
economic nationalists and a new Progressive wing (led by Theodore 
Roosevelt).154  Accordingly, even though the Republicans controlled  
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 146 See id. § 6, 26 Stat. at 828 (authorizing discretionary review from the new appellate courts 
over diversity actions as well as cases arising under patent laws, revenue laws, federal criminal 
law, and admiralty cases).  The statute also gave the Supreme Court direct appellate review over 
certain matters from the lower federal courts, including prize cases, many criminal cases, and any 
case challenging the constitutionality of federal or state law or otherwise requiring the construc-
tion of a constitutional provision.  See id. § 5, 26 Stat. at 827–28. 
 147 Gillman, supra note 72, at 521. 
 148 After Representative Culberson left Congress in 1897, other members proposed the legisla-
tion.  See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 125, at 137–38 & 137 n.155. 
 149 See, e.g., 33 CONG. REC. 221 (1899); 26 CONG. REC. 3408 (1894); 23 CONG. REC. 200 
(1892).  Other variants of the same theme were proposed.  For example, Representative William 
Terry, an Arkansas Democrat, introduced a bill that would restrict diversity jurisdiction in suits 
involving railroads.  See 25 CONG. REC. 1360 (1893). 
 150 See, e.g., 24 CONG. REC. 218 (1892) (showing that the House by a two-thirds majority 
agreed to suspend the rules and pass the Culberson bill); 26 CONG. REC. 7608–09 (1894) (showing 
that the House passed by a vote of 158–12 Representative Terry’s proposal to limit federal juris-
diction in diversity suits involving railroads). 
 151 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 125, at 137. 
 152 26 CONG. REC. 8594 (1894) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.). 
 153 See Chambers, supra note 104, at 14 (noting that, during the fourth party system, which 
lasted from 1896 to 1932, Progressive reformers gained political strength). 
 154 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 71, at 261 (observing that “conservatives faced new chal-
lenges in the first decades of the twentieth century from progressive reformers within the Repub-
lican Party,” including Theodore Roosevelt, who managed to “fractur[e] apparent legislative  
majorities”). 
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the Senate throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, it was 
no longer clear that the economic nationalist faction of the party 
would be able to block additional jurisdiction-stripping measures. 
In this environment, Representative Finis Garrett, the new cham-
pion of limiting federal jurisdiction, introduced a bill to prevent corpo-
rations from removing any diversity suit to federal court.  On January 
18, 1911, Representative Garrett sought to add this “corporation 
clause” as an amendment to a larger judiciary bill.155  Although there 
was still opposition from some Republicans, particularly from the 
North,156 other Republicans expressed support for the measure.157  
The bill (with the amendment included) ultimately passed the House 
with this bipartisan support.158 
In contrast to the other jurisdiction-stripping bills, the Garrett 
amendment was not buried by the Senate Judiciary Committee.  In-
stead, the measure was incorporated into the conference report nego-
tiated by the House and Senate.159  It appeared that the long-
advocated restriction on federal jurisdiction might finally be enacted 
into law. 
However, when the conference report was presented to the Senate, 
Republican Senator Albert Beveridge objected to the Garrett amend-
ment and threatened to filibuster the bill as long as it contained that 
provision.160  There was apparently insufficient support to withstand 
such a filibuster, because the Senate and House conferees relented.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 155 See 46 CONG. REC. 1060 (1911).  Representative Garrett’s amendment, in its final form, 
provided as follows: 
 Provided further, That no suit against a corporation or joint-stock company 
brought in a State court of the State in which the plaintiff resides or in which the cause 
of action arose, or within which the defendant has its place of business, or carries on its 
business, shall be removed to any court of the United States on the ground of diverse  
citizenship. 
Id. at 1071. 
 156 See, e.g., id. at 1068 (statement of Rep. Reuben Moon, R-Pa.) (urging that “in new States 
and in new Territories foreign capital goes there because of what is regarded to be the greater se-
curity extended by the Federal courts,” and that if Congress took away corporations’ right to re-
move cases to federal court, “my theory is that you may drive capital away”). 
 157 See id. at 1067 (statement of Rep. Eben Martin, R-S.D.) (“[T]here has been a growing abuse 
in the habit of corporations seeking removals from State courts merely for the purpose of delaying 
or annoying litigants in just cases. . . . [T]he legislation is both needed and wise.”). 
 158 See id. at 1073.  The Congressional Record does not show the precise number of votes.  But 
the Republicans had a majority of 219–172 in this House, see HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra 
note 119, at 5-201, so the bill could not have passed without the support of at least some  
Republicans. 
 159 See 46 CONG. REC. 3760–61 (1911) (including the Garrett amendment as Section 28 of the 
conference report). 
 160 See id. at 3853; source cited infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
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They agreed to withdraw the conference report and present a new one 
without the jurisdictional limit on corporate suits.161 
When the revised measure went back to the House, Representative 
Garrett complained that his “amendment [was not] rejected by the 
other legislative body.”162  He declared: “[I]f this House yields, it does 
not yield to the judgment” of the full Senate, but instead “yield[s]  
to one man.”163  The House nevertheless voted to accept the confer-
ence report.164  Accordingly (as one Democrat remarked in dismay),  
the scope of federal jurisdiction was preserved by a “one-man  
filibuster.”165 
Throughout this period, and despite the increasing political power 
of the Progressives, the economic nationalist wing of the Republican 
Party managed to veto efforts to curb federal jurisdiction over suits 
involving corporations.  When such proposals made it through the 
House, they were always defeated in the Senate.166  Indeed, no other 
jurisdiction-stripping measure made it as far as the Garrett  
amendment.167 
The economic nationalists may have retained sufficient political 
power in the Senate to block this jurisdiction-stripping legislation in 
part because of that body’s structural design.  Senators serve six-year 
terms, and only one-third of the chamber may change hands in a given 
election cycle.  Accordingly, the Senate is structured in such a manner 
as to be less responsive to emerging political trends, such as the Pro-
gressive movement.  Moreover, until the adoption of the Seventeenth 
Amendment in 1913, Senators were elected by state legislatures; the 
Senate was thus designed to be even less responsive to the general 
public will.168  These structural features, along with Senate-created 
rules like the filibuster, seem to have enabled the economic nationalists 
to maintain their “political veto over [the Progressives’ jurisdiction-
stripping] efforts.”169 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 161 See 46 CONG. REC. 3847, 3853 (1911) (showing that the Senate modified the conference 
report to “stri[ke] out” section 28 (the Garrett amendment), id. at 3853); id. at 4001 (statement of 
House conferees). 
 162 Id. at 4007 (statement of Rep. Finis Garrett, D-Tenn.). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 4012 (showing that, on March 2, 1911, the House voted 161–36 to adopt the report). 
 165 Id. at 4007 (statement of Rep. Charles Carlin, D-Va.). 
 166 See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 125, at 138–43 & 138 n.156, 142 n.169 & 143 
n.171 (noting various unsuccessful efforts to restrict federal jurisdiction). 
 167 See id. 
 168 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; LEONARD, supra note 93, at 27 (observing that, under the 
original constitutional design, “Senators would remain few in number, chosen by the state legisla-
tures and given long terms to insulate them from popular pressures and encourage collegial delib-
eration in the public interest”). 
 169 Gillman, supra note 72, at 521. 
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IV.  STRUCTURAL VETO POINTS IN THE MODERN ERA 
The next major set of challenges to federal jurisdiction came in the 
mid- to late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in response to 
Supreme Court and inferior federal court decisions involving federal 
constitutional claims.  But this time the objections came primarily 
from conservatives.  Federal court decisions involving abortion, reap-
portionment, desegregation, and religion aroused objections among a 
number of social conservatives, who repeatedly introduced bills to 
strip Supreme Court and lower federal court jurisdiction over these 
constitutional claims.  As in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, however, one political faction (this time, social progressives 
— principally in the Democratic Party) consistently maintained suffi-
cient structural veto points to preserve federal jurisdiction. 
A.  Jurisdiction-Stripping Efforts: 1970s and 1980s 
As political science professor Keith Whittington has explained, the 
political parties of the twentieth century were coalition parties.170  The 
Democrats, in particular, were sharply split between a progressive 
wing that favored the civil rights movement and other social reforms 
and a more conservative faction based largely in the South.171  The 
Republicans were still the party of fiscal restraint but also included a 
growing number of social conservatives.172 
As in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the overall 
content of federal jurisprudence found favor with one of these political 
factions.  The Supreme Court’s civil liberties decisions generally ac-
corded with the views of the socially progressive wing of the Demo-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 170 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 71, at 273 (observing that, during this era, the parties “in-
tegrat[ed] disparate ideological elements into their electoral and legislative coalitions that persis-
tently resisted the direction of presidential and party leadership”).  The parties became far less 
internally cohesive after the Progressive reforms of the early twentieth century (such as the secret 
ballot and the direct primary) weakened the parties’ control over their members.  See MORRIS 
FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 7 (2d ed. 2003); Chambers, supra note 104, at 13–15. 
 171 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 71, at 268–69 (noting “basic divisions within the New Deal 
coalition” between politicians who were more progressive on racial and other social issues and “[a] 
substantial group of conservative Democrats, especially from the South”); see also FIORINA, su-
pra note 170, at 165 (similarly suggesting that, even when the Democrats had a unified govern-
ment, “defections by Southern Democrats blocked some parts of the agendas of Democratic presi-
dents such as Roosevelt and Kennedy”). 
 172 See Mark D. Brewer, The Rise of Partisanship and the Expansion of Partisan Conflict 
Within the American Electorate, 58 POL. RES. Q. 219, 220 (2005) (noting that the Republican Par-
ty has long included a number of economic conservatives and that, since the late 1970s and the 
1980s, the party has taken a steadily more conservative stance on “matters relating to race [and] 
cultural concerns”); Graber, supra note 71, at 54–55 (observing that Republicans of this period 
“urged less interference with private market forces,” id. at 54, and were “internally divided over 
[social] issues, but to a lesser degree [than the Democrats], at least initially,” id. at 55). 
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cratic Party.173  Notably, such social progressives were not concen-
trated exclusively in the Democratic Party; there were also progressive 
Republicans who opposed jurisdiction-stripping proposals during this 
period.174  By contrast, socially conservative Republicans, aligned with 
conservative Southern Democrats, generally supported jurisdiction-
stripping legislation.175  But the more progressive legislators always 
maintained sufficient political power in one chamber of Congress — 
during this period, the Democrat-controlled House of Representa-
tives — to veto these jurisdiction-stripping efforts. 
Of course, the progressives did not need to exercise their structural 
veto in every instance.  Many of the bills that sought to strip federal 
jurisdiction never even made it out of committee.176  But several other 
proposals in the mid- to late twentieth century went to the floor of at 
least one chamber of Congress.177 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 173 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 71, at 119–20, 271 (“Just as national conservatives in the 
Republican Party in the first decades of the twentieth century had welcomed judicial monitoring 
of the states and Congress for progressive legislation that violated their constitutional understand-
ings, so national liberals in the Democratic Party in the middle decades of the twentieth century 
welcomed judicial action against conservative states and Congress that violated liberal constitu-
tional commitments.”  Id. at 271.). 
 174 See Graber, supra note 71, at 55; infra Appendix, pp. 935–37 (noting the breakdown of votes 
on the jurisdiction-stripping proposals). 
 175 See infra Appendix, pp. 935–37 (noting the breakdown of votes). 
 176 See Max Baucus & Kenneth R. Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the Consti-
tution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REV. 988, 992–94 (1982) (discussing various unsuc-
cessful jurisdiction-stripping attempts). 
 177 For example, during the second Red Scare, there was an effort to strip the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving alleged communist “subversives.”  Senator William 
Jenner, an Indiana Republican, introduced a measure in 1957 that sought to eliminate the Court’s 
jurisdiction over five categories of “subversive activity” cases.  See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, 
CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT 1957–1960, at 31 (1973).  Following a Senate Judi-
ciary Committee hearing (in which a number of people, including President Eisenhower’s second 
Attorney General William Rogers, testified against the Jenner bill, see Limitation of Appellate Ju-
risdiction of the Supreme Court: Hearing Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Admin. of the 
Internal Sec. Act and Other Internal Sec. Laws of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 572–
74 (1958)), Senator John Butler (R-Md.) introduced a modified bill that eliminated all but one of 
the jurisdiction-stripping provisions.  See PRITCHETT, supra, at 32–33 (noting that the Butler 
amendment “substantially changed the character of the bill”).  Ultimately, the Senate rejected the 
“Jenner-Butler bill” in its entirety.  See 104 CONG. REC. 18,687 (1958) (showing that the Senate 
defeated the measure by a vote of 49–41). 
  There was also an effort to modify Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), by restricting 
federal jurisdiction.  See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 9–10 (1968) (proposing an amendment that 
would prohibit the Supreme Court or any inferior federal court from “disturb[ing],” id. at 10, a 
state court decision admitting a confession into evidence, as long as the confession was given vol-
untarily).  But this provision was later eliminated from the bill.  See 114 CONG. REC. 14,175–77 
(1968) (showing that the Senate voted 52–32 to remove the provision from the bill).  Accordingly, 
much like the Jenner-Butler bill, this jurisdiction-stripping proposal did not pass one chamber of 
Congress. 
  In 1964, Representative William Tuck, a Virginia Democrat, introduced a measure to elimi-
nate federal jurisdiction over reapportionment cases.  The House of Representatives passed the 
bill, see 110 CONG. REC. 20,300 (1964) (showing that the House passed the measure by a vote of 
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I focus here on two of those proposals.  These bills sought to strip 
Supreme Court and lower federal court jurisdiction over cases involv-
ing voluntary school prayer and to remove the courts’ authority to or-
der mandatory busing in school desegregation cases.  I highlight these 
two measures because, in many respects, they seemed to have the 
greatest chance of success.  Both measures passed the Senate in the 
late 1970s or early 1980s.  Furthermore, the school prayer and busing 
decisions were among the least popular of the Supreme Court’s civil 
liberties rulings.  According to a study by Professors Nathaniel Persily, 
Jack Citrin, and Patrick Egan, the vast majority of Americans in the 
1970s and 1980s opposed these decisions.178  Over seventy percent of 
the public disapproved of the Court’s school prayer decisions,179 and 
over eighty percent opposed the use of busing to integrate public 
schools.180  Given the state of public opinion, these two proposals pre-
sented a strong test for the structural safeguards of federal jurisdiction. 
1.  School Prayer. — In the 1970s, Senator Jesse Helms repeatedly 
proposed legislation to strip Supreme Court and inferior federal court 
jurisdiction over cases involving voluntary school prayer.181  Senator 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
218–175), but the Senate rejected the measure, see Reapportionment of State Legislatures: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th 
Cong. 257 (1965) (showing a report from a Senate committee concluding that the Tuck bill and 
other jurisdictional restrictions were “extremely ill-advised”).  Although this measure passed one 
chamber of Congress, I do not focus on this example for two reasons.  The Supreme Court’s reap-
portionment decisions were unique in their impact on members of the House; modifying the dis-
tricting scheme could have cost House members their jobs.  By contrast, the Court’s decisions had 
no effect on the Senate.  Accordingly, the House’s passage (and the Senate’s rejection) of this ju-
risdiction-stripping bill may not be generalizable to other contexts.  Moreover, unlike the school 
prayer and busing cases that I highlight, the public by and large supported the Court’s reappor-
tionment decisions.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 110, at 269. 
 178 See Michael Murakami, Desegregation, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY 18, 34–35 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008) (busing); 
Alison Gash & Angelo Gonzales, School Prayer, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY, supra, at 62, 68–70, 77 (school prayer). 
 179 See Gash & Gonzales, supra note 178, at 70. 
 180 See Murakami, supra note 178, at 36. 
 181 See LOUIS FISHER, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 130 (2002) (noting that Senator 
Helms “took the lead in promoting this type of court-stripping bill” and began introducing such 
measures in 1974).  The school prayer measure provided: 
§ 1259.  Appellate jurisdiction; limitations 
[T]he Supreme Court shall not have jurisdiction to review, by appeal, writ of certiorari, 
or otherwise, any case arising out of any State statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, or any 
part thereof, or arising out of any Act, interpreting, applying, or enforcing a State stat-
ute, ordinance, rule, or regulation, which relates to voluntary prayers in public schools 
and public buildings. . . . 
. . . . 
§ 1364.  Limitations on jurisdiction 
[T]he district courts shall not have jurisdiction of any case or question which the Su-
preme Court does not have jurisdiction to review under section 1259 of this title. 
125 CONG. REC. 7577 (1979). 
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Helms argued that the Supreme Court erred in Engel v. Vitale182 and 
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,183 when it struck 
down state laws requiring the recitation of prayer in public school.184  
“In both rulings,” he contended, “the Court went beyond the language 
of the establishment clause to construct an interpretation of it which 
would overturn the long-standing State practices.”185  He complained 
that the Court had invalidated the state laws in Engel and Schempp, 
“even though the prayer and Bible-reading activities were voluntary,” 
because the students could opt out.186 
Senator Helms argued that Congress had ample authority to cor-
rect such errors by regulating the Court’s jurisdiction: 
  In anticipation of judicial usurpations of power, the framers of our 
Constitution wisely gave the Congress the authority, by a simple majority 
of both Houses, to check the Supreme Court by means of regulation of its 
appellate jurisdiction.  Section 2 of article III states in clear and unequiv-
ocal language that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is subject to 
“such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall 
make.”187 
He also emphasized that, under his proposal (which would eliminate 
all federal court jurisdiction over school prayer cases), a citizen could 
still obtain “a judicial settlement of his rights” in state court.188 
The opponents of this legislation criticized it as applied to all feder-
al courts, but they raised special concerns about the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction.189  Senator Birch Bayh and others argued that the bill, if 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 182 370 U.S. 421, 430–33 (1962) (invalidating, on Establishment Clause grounds, a school prayer 
program created by New York). 
 183 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (invalidating, on Establishment Clause grounds, programs in Mary-
land and Pennsylvania that required students to read Bible verses and recite the Lord’s Prayer). 
 184 See 125 CONG. REC. 7577 (1979) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C.). 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 7578; see Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224–25 (noting that students were permitted to opt out 
of the religious activities); Engel, 370 U.S. at 430 (same). 
 187 125 CONG. REC. 7579 (1979) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2); see id. at 7637 
(statement of Sen. Gordon Humphrey, R-N.H.) (similarly noting favorably that Congress has “the 
authority, by a simple majority of both Houses, to check the Supreme Court through regulation of 
its appellate jurisdiction”). 
 188 Id. at 7579 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C.) (“Implicit in this bill is the understand-
ing that the American citizen will have recourse to a judicial settlement of his rights . . . in the 
State courts . . . .  This is where our religious freedoms were always safeguarded for 173 years un-
til they were nationalized by the Supreme Court.”). 
 189 See id. at 7631 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.) (stating that “[n]o one really 
questions that we in this body have the power effectively to destroy the [federal] judiciary,” urging 
senators to be wary of exercising that power, and emphasizing in particular that the Helms 
amendment constituted an “assault on the Supreme Court”); id. at 7579 (statement of Sen. Abra-
ham Ribicoff, D-Conn.) (opposing the Helms amendment, in part because it “challenge[d] the au-
thority of the Supreme Court”). 
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enacted, would set “a very dangerous precedent”190 that would make it 
easier for future Congresses to strip federal jurisdiction over other con-
stitutional issues.191  Senator Ted Kennedy warned that a future legis-
lature might even target constitutional claims that most conservatives 
favored, passing laws providing that “no [inferior] Federal court or Su-
preme Court” could adjudicate free speech or property rights cases.192  
Some senators also questioned whether Congress had the power to 
eliminate the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over constitutional is-
sues.193  Others insisted that, even if Congress had such authority, it 
would be unwise to leave the resolution of federal constitutional ques-
tions to fifty different states.194 
The executive branch (which was then led by President Jimmy 
Carter) also opposed the school prayer measure, expressing particular 
concern about the restriction on Supreme Court jurisdiction.  The De-
partment of Justice advised Congress in a memorandum that “the so-
called ‘Helms amendment’ [was] unconstitutional to the extent that it 
would purport to divest the Supreme Court of . . . jurisdiction.”195  
The DOJ also urged that the measure, even if valid, “would run afoul 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 190 Id. at 7654 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, D-Ind.) (“We are setting a very dangerous 
precedent that could go far beyond prayer.”); see id. at 7632 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, 
D-Mass.) (“I hope we understand the extraordinarily dangerous aspect and precedent of this 
amendment.”). 
 191 See id. at 7644 (statement of Sen. John Durkin, D-N.H.) (“This type of restriction on the 
judicial power, once applied in this instance, will become ever easier to apply in the future.  The 
appetite for this restrictive practice will grow . . . . The result will be to weaken, if not cripple, the 
independence of the Federal judiciary . . . .”). 
 192 Id. at 7632 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.) (“I would think that others in this 
body would be somewhat leery of this particular procedure.  It might not be long before Members 
of this body . . . say, ‘We are going to confiscate certain business properties in this country,’ and 
then . . . say that no Federal court or Supreme Court will have jurisdiction over this matter, or 
over compensation, or due process for businesses. . . . [S]ometime in the future, the free press 
might be under assault or attack. . . . The Helms amendment establishes a precedent for all types 
of mis[c]hief.”). 
 193 See id. at 7633 (statement of Sen. Charles Mathias, Jr., R-Md.) (arguing that the Helms 
amendment was “a back door for changing the organic law of the country,” and thereby would 
“bypass[] article V of the Constitution”). 
 194 See, e.g., id. at 7632 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.) (“We are going to run 
into a situation in which 50 States could have 50 different interpretations of what the law of the 
land is . . . .”). 
 195 Prayer in Public Schools and Buildings — Federal Court Jurisdiction: Hearing on S. 450 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 96th Cong. 14 (1980) [hereinafter Prayer in Public Schools Hearing] (memorandum of 
Larry L. Sims, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., in response to request for Office of Legal Counsel’s 
views on the Helms amendment).  The DOJ urged in part that the bill was at odds with the Su-
premacy Clause, id. at 19–20 (statement of John Harmon, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice), because it would prevent the Supreme Court from “insur[ing] 
that . . . ‘the judges in every State will [sic] be bound’ by the provisions of the Constitution guar-
anteeing religious freedom.”  Id. at 20 (statement of John Harmon, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). 
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of the public interest in . . . a uniform, definitive and dispositive na-
tion-wide resolution of issues of constitutional magnitude.”196  In tes-
timony before Congress, Assistant Attorney General John Harmon de-
clared that he was “confident” the Attorney General would recommend 
that President Carter veto any bill containing the Helms  
amendment.197 
In response, Senator Helms pointed to prior jurisdiction-stripping 
bills, including proposals to strip the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over 
reapportionment cases and Miranda issues, as precedent to support the 
constitutionality and propriety of his school prayer measure.198  Sena-
tor Kennedy responded, however, that “[t]he fact is that none of those 
[bills] is law.”199 
For several years, these school prayer bills died in the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee.200  So, in 1979, Senator Helms brought the jurisdic-
tion-stripping proposal to the Senate floor, seeking to attach it to a bill 
that would create the Department of Education.201  On April 5, 1979, 
the school prayer measure passed the Senate with the support of so-
cially conservative Republicans and Democrats (principally from the 
South).202 
Several senators (including supporters of the measure) were, how-
ever, concerned that the Helms amendment would not be acceptable to 
the House of Representatives and would lead the House to reject (or 
delay) the establishment of the Department of Education.203  Accord-
ingly, on April 9, 1979, at the suggestion of Senate Majority Leader 
Robert Byrd, the jurisdiction-stripping provision was removed from 
the education bill and attached to a separate bill relating to the judi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 196 125 CONG. REC. 7637 (1979) (quoting Letter from Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., to Sen. Abra-
ham Ribicoff, D-Conn., Chairman, Senate Comm. on Gov’t Operations (Apr. 9, 1979)). 
 197 Prayer in Public Schools Hearing, supra note 195, at 23. 
 198 See 125 CONG. REC. 7636 (1979) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C.).  For a discussion 
of those proposals, see supra note 177. 
 199 125 CONG. REC. 7636 (1979) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.). 
 200 See id. at 7634–35 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C.) (noting that “this matter has 
been referred to the Judiciary Committee time and time and time again,” id. at 7634, and that he 
had “[pled] for hearings for at least 5 years, and not a syllable of interest has been shown,” id. at 
7635). 
 201 See id. at 7576–77. 
 202 The Senate voted 47–37 to add the jurisdiction-stripping amendment to the Department of 
Education bill.  See id. at 7581; infra Appendix, p. 935 (showing the breakdown of votes on the 
measure). 
 203 See 125 CONG. REC. 7630 (1979) (statement of Sen. Robert C. Byrd, D-W. Va.) (“I am 
afraid that [the Helms] amendment, if it stays on the education bill, will endanger the possible 
future enactment of that legislation.”); id. at 7650 (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff, D-Conn.) 
(“There is no question in my mind that if the Helms amendment were attached . . . it would tend 
to kill the Department of Education bill.”). 
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ciary.204  Senator Byrd explained that, although he supported the pro-
posal, “in the minds of many, the [addition] of this amendment to the 
Department of Education bill could prove . . . fatal to the bill” in the 
House.205  Senator Helms and other supporters complained that  
this procedural move was “the surest way to kill the prayer  
amendment.”206 
The school prayer bill went to the House Judiciary Committee, 
where it lingered without action for fifteen months.207  Finally, a sub-
committee held hearings on the measure.  The members of the sub-
committee made clear at the outset that they had serious reservations 
about the jurisdiction-stripping proposal.208  For example, Representa-
tive Robert Kastenmeier, the subcommittee chairman, declared that he 
was “troubled by the prospect . . . of denying citizens access to the 
Federal courts with regard to an important constitutional issue.”209  
And Representative Harold Sawyer stated that, although he was “in 
favor of allowing voluntary prayer in the schools,” “the thing that 
frighten[ed] [him] about the Helms amendment” was that it might en-
courage future efforts to “deprive the Supreme Court of any jurisdic-
tion to cover the due process clause, or civil rights, or equal treatment” 
and thereby “virtually emasculate the Bill of Rights.”210 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 204 See id. at 7630 (statement of Sen. Robert C. Byrd, D-W. Va.) (urging that the judiciary bill 
“would be a more appropriate vehicle”).  The Senate voted 51–40 to add the Helms amendment to 
the judiciary bill (which would have reduced the Supreme Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdic-
tion and expanded its discretionary certiorari jurisdiction, see Prayer in Public Schools Hearing, 
supra note 195, at 4–8).  See 125 CONG. REC. 7644 (1979); infra Appendix, p. 936 (showing the 
breakdown of votes on the measure).  That bill ultimately passed the Senate by a vote of 61–30.  
See 125 CONG. REC. 7648 (1979).  The Senate later voted 53–40 to remove the Helms amend-
ment from the education bill.  See id. at 7657; infra Appendix, p. 937 (showing the breakdown  
of votes). 
 205 125 CONG. REC. 7652 (1979) (statement of Sen. Robert C. Byrd, D-W. Va.). 
 206 Id. at 7630 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C.) (opposing Senator Byrd’s proposal, and 
stating that “some Senators are concerned that this is the surest way to kill the prayer amend-
ment. . . . [T]here is great doubt that the House will even have an opportunity to vote on [the ju-
diciary bill] once it goes to the House Judiciary Committee”); see also id. at 7656 (statement of 
Sen. James McClure, R-Idaho) (urging that this change was designed to “give [the amendment] a 
convenient vehicle upon which it can conveniently die”). 
 207 See Prayer in Public Schools Hearing, supra note 195, at i (showing that the subcommittee 
did not begin hearings until July 1980, even though the Senate passed the bill in April 1979). 
 208 See id. at 25 (statement of Rep. George Danielson, D-Cal.) (stating that he “agree[d] with” 
the Department of Justice that the school prayer amendment was unconstitutional). 
 209 Id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier, D-Wis., Chairman, S. Comm. on Courts, 
Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“[A]s chairman . . . I 
have become keenly aware of the problems of ‘access to justice’ in this country.  I am troubled by 
the prospect in this legislation of denying citizens access to the Federal courts with regard to an 
important constitutional issue such as this.”). 
 210 Id. at 26 (statement of Rep. Harold Samuel Sawyer, R-Mich.). 
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One member of the House sought to have the school prayer bill 
removed from the Judiciary Committee and sent to the House floor.211  
But ultimately the House never voted on the measure. 
2.  Busing. — Soon after the 1980 elections,212 Senator John Ben-
nett Johnston introduced a bill that would strip federal jurisdiction to 
order mandatory busing of children in school desegregation cases.213  
The debates over this measure mirrored those involving the school 
prayer proposal.  Many Democrats and some Republicans questioned 
the constitutionality of the bill and also doubted the propriety of inter-
fering with the federal courts’ handling of civil rights cases.214  And 
once again the Senators expressed particular concern about interfering 
with the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.215 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 211 See id. at 386 (statement of Martha Rountree, President, Leadership Found.) (“When almost 
7 months went by without any action on the part of [the House subcommittee], Congressman Phil 
Crane [(R-Ill.)] filed discharge petition No. 7, on Helms’ bill, S. 450.  This meant that if 218 
Members in the House — a simple majority — signed this discharge petition it would automati-
cally go to the floor of the House for a vote.”); EDWARD KEYNES WITH RANDALL K. MILLER, 
THE COURT VS. CONGRESS 200 (1989). 
 212 The Republicans gained a majority in the Senate in the 1980 elections.  See HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS, supra note 119, at 5-202 (showing that, after the 1980 elections, the Republicans had 
a 53–46 majority in the Senate and that the Democrats controlled the House 243–192). 
 213 See 127 CONG. REC. 13,190 (1981). The bill provided in pertinent part: 
 (c)(1) No court of the United States may order or issue any writ ordering directly or 
indirectly any student to be assigned or to be transported to a public school other than 
that which is closest to the student’s residence unless — 
 (i) such assignment or transportation is provided incident to the voluntary atten-
daance [sic] at a ‘magnet’, vocational, technical, or other school of specialized or indi-
vidual instruction;  
 (ii) such assignment or transportation is provided incident to the voluntary atten-
dance of a student at a school; or  
 (iii) the requirement of such transportation is reasonable. 
Id.  The bill further specified that “the assignment of transportation of students shall not be rea-
sonable . . . if,” for example, “the total actual daily [travel] time . . . exceeds by 30 minutes the ac-
tual daily time consumed in travel by schoolbus to and from the public school with a grade level 
identical to that of the student and which is closest to the student’s residence.”  Id. 
 214 See 128 CONG. REC. 885 (1982) (statement of Sen. Donald Riegle, Jr., D-Mich.) (stating 
that, although he was “strongly opposed to forced school busing,” he was “voting against this 
amendment because [he] believe[d] it [was] unconstitutional”); id. at 874 (statement of Sen. Lowell 
Weicker, Jr., R-Conn.) (stating that “[s]ooner or later . . . if we follow this precedent, it will be 
some other portion of our society that has become unpopular . . . .  Maybe it will be the elder-
ly . . . .  Maybe it will be the workingman, the laborer.  Maybe it will be the politician.  Maybe it 
will be the news media” who will lose federal court protection); id. at 864 (statement of Sen. Carl 
Levin, D-Mich.) (stating that, although he “share[d] . . . the general dislike of busing children 
away from their neighborhood schools,” he was “deeply troubled by this amendment,” because it 
“would remove from the Federal courts the power to enforce the Constitution”). 
 215 See, e.g., id. at 868–69 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich.) (emphasizing the need for 
uniformity in federal constitutional law, and stating that “Supreme Court decisions requiring so-
cial change are often unpopular. . . . This amendment is the modern version of Court packing”).  
The Senate also received a letter from the Conference of Chief Justices of the state courts, in 
which they expressed their disapproval of various bills to limit the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction 
over school prayer, busing, and other issues.  See id. at 869.  The judges vowed “to give full force 
to controlling Supreme Court precedents.”  Id. (quoting Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution, 
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The executive branch (then led by President Ronald Reagan) also 
defended the Court’s jurisdiction.  Assistant Attorney General Ted Ol-
son informed Congress that the Department of Justice interpreted the 
busing restriction so as to exempt the Supreme Court and that, so con-
strued, it was constitutional.216  He asserted that the validity of the 
measure would be “far more debatable” if it applied to the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.217 
Senator Lowell Weicker filibustered the school busing bill for near-
ly eight months and successfully fought off three cloture motions.218  
But, on February 4, 1982, Senator Johnston and other supporters man-
aged to assemble the sixty votes necessary for cloture.219  The juris-
diction-stripping bill ultimately passed the Senate by a considerable  
margin.220 
However, again like the school prayer bill, this jurisdiction-
stripping measure was defeated in the House Judiciary Committee.  
During hearings on the proposal, Representative Kastenmeier under-
scored that he viewed the bill “as part and parcel of various bills pend-
ing before [his subcommittee] which seek to eliminate the jurisdiction 
of the Federal judiciary to consider constitutional claims.”221  The sub-
committee members had “certainly made no secret of [their] reserva-
tions” about such legislation.222  And although one representative 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Jan. 30, 1982).  But they also expressed concern about the lack of uniformity that would invaria-
bly result from stripping the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  Id. (“Without the unifying function of 
United States Supreme Court review, there inevitably will be divergence in state court decisions, 
and thus the United States Constitution could mean something different in each of the fifty 
states . . . .”). 
 216 See Limitations on Court-Ordered Busing — Neighborhood School Act: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
97th Cong. 133–34 (1982) [hereinafter Limitations on Court-Ordered Busing Hearings] (statement 
of Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice). 
 217 Id. at 134.  Senator Johnston stated, however, that the bill did apply to the Supreme Court.  
Id. at 35, 47 (statement of Sen. John Bennett Johnston, Jr., D-La.) (“[L]et there be no mis-
take . . . the language of the act . . . ‘no Court of the United States may’ . . . clearly . . . appl[ies] to 
all [federal] courts.”). 
 218 The bill was introduced on June 22, 1981, see 127 CONG. REC. 13,189–90 (1981), and was 
filibustered in the Senate for eight months until February 4, 1982, see Limitations on Court-
Ordered Busing Hearings, supra note 216, at 70 (statement of Rep. Harold Sawyer, R-Mich.) (not-
ing that Senator Weicker, R-Conn., “tied everybody up in a filibuster”); id. (statement of Rep. Wil-
liam “Henson” Moore, III, R-La.) (stating that there were “three different cloture motions and the 
Senate voted not to close the debate”); 128 CONG. REC. 864 (1982) (showing that there was a clo-
ture motion on February 4). 
 219 See 128 CONG. REC. 864, 886 (1982). 
 220 The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 58–38.  See id. at 886; infra Appendix, p. 937 (show-
ing the breakdown of votes). 
 221 Limitations on Court-Ordered Busing Hearings, supra note 216, at 2 (statement of Rep. Ro-
bert W. Kastenmeier, D-Wis., Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of 
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 222 Id.; see id. at 48 (statement of Rep. Tom Railsback, R-Ill.) (“I am really troubled that we 
may be setting a precedent by inhibiting or restricting the Federal courts’ jurisdiction in this area, 
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sought to discharge the bill from the Judiciary Committee and send it 
to the House floor,223 that effort failed.  The bill never emerged from 
committee. 
It may seem surprising that these two bills, which arose out of 
strong popular opposition to Supreme Court decisions, made it through 
the Senate and not the (typically more responsive) House.  But this 
may reflect different structural features of the Senate.  As discussed, 
the Senate is designed to give disproportionate power to individual 
state concerns,224 and opposition to the Supreme Court’s school prayer 
and busing decisions was particularly high in specific geographic  
regions.225 
Moreover, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, these issues had been 
on the legal landscape for some time and had already experienced the 
Senate “lag” (that is, the Senate’s tendency to respond slowly to popu-
lar sentiment).  The Supreme Court issued its school prayer decisions 
in the early 1960s,226 and Senator Helms brought up the school prayer 
proposal for years — and had to bypass the Senate Judiciary Commit-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
which could lead to us restricting it as well in other areas.”); id. at 59 (statement of Rep. Patricia 
Schroeder, D-Colo.) (stating that “this is a very dangerous precedent”); id. at 61 (statement of Rep. 
Harold S. Sawyer, R-Mich.) (“I think that it is so flagrantly and patently an attempt to amend the 
Constitution by a simple vote of both Houses that you will never survive in the Supreme 
Court . . . . [A]nd I am basically in favor of getting rid of busing.”); id. at 215 (statement of Rep. 
Barney Frank, D-Mass.) (urging that, if the bill were to pass and be “upheld . . . , then the distinc-
tion between the Constitution and statutory law . . . would have simply gone away”). 
 223 See id. at 217–18 (statement of Rep. James Collins, R-Tex.) (explaining that he filed a dis-
charge petition on May 25, 1982, and that, “[o]nce we reach 218 [signatures], the bill will be 
brought to the House floor for consideration,” id. at 218). 
 224 See sources cited supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 225 The effects of the Supreme Court’s busing decisions were concentrated in specific geograph-
ic regions, particularly the South.  The Supreme Court first upheld busing in the South, see 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29–31 (1971), and many of the early 
busing cases involved school districts in that region, see J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM 
BROWN TO BAKKE 135–39, 149–60 (1979) (discussing the strong opposition to some of the early 
busing orders in the late 1960s and early 1970s in southern cities, such as Richmond, Virginia, and 
Charlotte, North Carolina).  Mandatory busing orders began to emerge in other areas in the mid-
1970s.  See id. at 197–202, 206–15 (discussing busing orders in Denver and Boston). 
  Likewise, opposition to the Court’s school prayer decisions is especially high among certain 
religious groups (such as evangelical Protestants) who are heavily concentrated in the South.  See 
Gash & Gonzales, supra note 178, at 74–75 (reporting, based on a statistical analysis, that “Chris-
tians who tend to adhere to an evangelical tradition (white evangelical Protestants and black 
Protestants),” id. at 74, are more likely than Catholics or mainline Protestants to disapprove of the 
Supreme Court’s school prayer decisions); THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. 
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 8 (2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/ 
report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf (“The South, by a wide margin, has the heaviest concen-
tration of members of evangelical Protestant churches.”); Jon T. Kilpinen, Map Gallery of Religion 
in the United States, AM. ETHNIC GEOGRAPHY, http://www.valpo.edu/geomet/geo/courses/ 
geo200/religion.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2011) (similarly indicating that evangelical Protestants, 
such as Baptists, are concentrated in the South). 
 226 See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421 (1962). 
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tee — before it finally went to a vote in that body.227  Likewise, man-
datory busing orders dated from the late 1960s,228 and the Senate had 
already defeated several jurisdiction-stripping proposals.229  Even the 
proposal by Senator Johnston was subject to a lengthy filibuster and 
three cloture motions before the Senate finally agreed to close debate 
and vote on the measure.230 
The House of Representatives, by contrast, remained firmly within 
the control of the Democratic Party throughout the mid- to late twen-
tieth century.231  Moreover, the House Judiciary Committee (particu-
larly the subcommittee that examined these jurisdiction-stripping bills) 
seems to have been dominated by social progressives from both parties 
who “made no secret of [their] reservations” about proposals that “seek 
to eliminate [federal] jurisdiction . . . [over] constitutional claims.”232  
And although there is no indication that a majority of the representa-
tives favored the Supreme Court’s busing or school prayer decisions,233 
there seems to have been sufficient support in the House for the 
Court’s overall constitutional jurisprudence for the representatives to 
oppose all jurisdiction-stripping measures.  There was at least suffi-
cient support to keep members from discharging the jurisdiction-
stripping bills from committee and bringing them to the House floor 
for a vote. 
But regardless of the reasons for the different outcomes in the 
House and Senate, this period further illustrates the difficulty of as-
sembling the supermajority necessary for jurisdiction-stripping legisla-
tion, at least when one major political faction supports the overall con-
tent of federal court decisions.  “Repeal was avoided” in the late 
twentieth century “because [supporters of the federal judiciary] main-
tained a political veto” in “at least one institution of the national  
government.”234 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 227 See sources cited supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text. 
 228 See supra note 225. 
 229 See Robert F. Nagel, A Comment on the Burger Court and “Judicial Activism,” 52 U.  
COLO. L. REV. 223, 232 n.38 (1981) (noting the defeat of several proposals in 1978 and 1979). 
 230 See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text. 
 231 See Jeffrey M. Stonecash & Mack D. Mariani, Republican Gains in the House in the 1994 
Elections: Class Polarization in American Politics, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 93, 93 (2000) (noting that, in 
1994, Republicans broke “the Democrats’ forty-year hold on the House of Representatives”). 
 232 Limitations on Court-Ordered Busing Hearings, supra note 216, at 2 (statement of Rep. Ro-
bert W. Kastenmeier, D-Wis., Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of 
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary).  
 233 Indeed, some progressive supporters of the judiciary expressly stated that they opposed the 
Court’s school prayer or busing decisions but sought to protect the judiciary’s overall authority to 
issue decisions in the cases they did favor.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 210 (statement 
of Rep. Harold S. Sawyer, R-Mich.); supra note 214 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich.). 
 234 Gillman, supra note 72, at 521. 
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B.  Present Day: Pledge and Marriage Protection Acts 
In the 1990s, the national political parties began to undergo some 
structural changes.  First, many voters from the South switched their 
official party allegiance to the Republicans, enabling that party in 1994 
to gain control of the House of Representatives for the first time in 
several decades.235  Second, during that same period, the parties began 
to look less like amalgamations of diverse coalitions.  Both parties be-
came more internally cohesive and more ideologically distinct from 
their opponents.236  The Republican Party was increasingly associated 
with not only pro-business concerns but also conservative social val-
ues.237  The Democratic Party, by contrast, was more closely aligned 
with the progressives,238 who had by and large supported the civil lib-
erties jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.239  In other words, while 
the social conservatives left the Democratic Party, the social progres-
sives began to exit the GOP. 
Accordingly, following the 2000 elections, when the Republicans 
gained control of both chambers of Congress and also held the Presi-
dency in George W. Bush,240 it may have seemed that the party had 
sufficient political strength to strip federal jurisdiction, if it so chose.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 235 See FIORINA, supra note 170, at 135–37 (noting that, in 1994, Republicans captured the 
House for the first time since 1952, in part because of the “normal mid-term loss,” id. at 136 — 
that is, the loss of seats typically suffered by the party that holds the Presidency — and in part 
because of a “realignment in the South,” id. at 137); Jonathan Knuckey, Explaining Recent 
Changes in the Partisan Identifications of Southern Whites, 59 POL. RES. Q. 57, 66 (2006) (ob-
serving that “[s]ince the mid-1990s, a Republican advantage has emerged in the party identifica-
tions of southern whites”). 
 236 See Brewer, supra note 172, at 219–20 (“By the end of the 1980s, partisanship in Congress 
had risen dramatically and has remained at a high level ever since. . . . At the same time the par-
ties were becoming more internally cohesive in their voting behavior, they were also becoming 
more ideologically polarized from each other[,] . . . with the Democrats becoming more liberal and 
the GOP becoming more conservative . . . .” (citations omitted)); Gary C. Jacobson, A House and 
Senate Divided: The Clinton Legacy and the Congressional Elections of 2000, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 5, 
6 (2001) (arguing that, in the 1990s, “the stark partisan polarization among the parties’ politi-
cians . . . accelerated”). 
 237 See Brewer, supra note 172, at 220 (arguing that “party elites are currently engaged in coher-
ent ideological conflict that reaches across issue[] areas; a Republican Party that is consistently 
conservative on matters relating to race, cultural concerns, and economic equality, and a Demo-
cratic Party that is equally liberal on the same issues”). 
 238 See id. 
 239 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 71, at 271. 
 240 Following the 2000 elections, the Senate was evenly divided, but the Republicans controlled 
that body because Vice President Dick Cheney could break a tie.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 245 
(128th ed. 2008) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (showing that, after the 2000 elections, 
the Republicans had a 221–212 majority in the House and the Democrats and Republicans were 
split 50–50 in the Senate); Jacobson, supra note 236, at 5.  The Republicans’ control over the Sen-
ate was short-lived because, in May 2001, Senator Jim Jeffords left the Republican Party and be-
came an Independent.  But the party regained control following the 2002 elections.  See STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT, supra, at 245. 
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Moreover, the Republicans’ control over Congress only increased after 
the 2002 and 2004 elections.241 
Several politically controversial cases did emerge during this pe-
riod.  There were a number of challenges to the Defense of Marriage 
Act,242 which provides that states need not recognize same-sex mar-
riages from other states.243  Moreover, in Newdow v. U.S. Congress,244 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the mandatory recita-
tion of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools because the Pledge 
contains the phrase “under God.”  The court explained that, under Su-
preme Court precedents (dating from the Warren and Burger Court 
eras), it had to examine the purpose of the statute245 and found that 
the legislative history plainly indicated that the “sole purpose [of the 
1954 statute adding ‘under God’ to the Pledge] was to advance reli-
gion, in order to differentiate the United States from nations under 
communist rule.”246  The Newdow decision met with severe disap-
proval in Congress.  Both the House and the Senate voted overwhelm-
ingly in favor of resolutions condemning the ruling.247  And although 
the Supreme Court later reversed Newdow on standing grounds, it did 
not decide the merits of the controversy.248 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 241 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 240, at 245 (showing that the Republicans had a 
229–204 majority in the House after the 2002 elections and a 232–202 majority after 2004 and 
that they had a 51–48 majority in the Senate after the 2002 elections and a majority of 55–44 after 
the 2004 elections). 
 242 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738C (2006)). 
 243 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C; Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 686 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)); Wilson v. 
Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (rejecting constitutional challenge to DOMA); 
In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 148 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (same).  Section 3 of DOMA also de-
fines marriage for purposes of federal law as “a legal union between one man and one woman.”  1 
U.S.C. § 7.  Two recent challenges to this part of the statute have succeeded at the district court 
level.  See Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 377 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that 
section 3 of DOMA violates the Equal Protection Clause); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 266 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that section 3 of DOMA vi-
olates the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause).  Both decisions are being appealed. 
 244 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Elk 
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 245 See id. at 605–12 (relying in part on the “Lemon test” from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602, 612–13 (1971), and the “endorsement” test from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 246 Id. at 610. 
 247 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 7–9 (2004) (noting that, on March 20, 2003, the House voted 
400–7 to declare that the decision was “inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the first amendment and should be overturned,” id. at 7, and that, on June 26, 2002, “the Senate 
reaffirmed support for the Pledge . . . by a vote of 99–0,” id. at 8–9). 
 248 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 15–18 (holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the chal-
lenge on behalf of his public school daughter because he did not have custody); see also id. at 18 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (declaring that “[t]he Court today erects a novel 
prudential standing principle in order to avoid reaching the merits of the constitutional claim”). 
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Both sets of cases generated jurisdiction-stripping efforts in Con-
gress.  Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Newdow, a group of 
representatives proposed legislation to strip inferior federal court ju-
risdiction over challenges to the use of “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance.249  The bill was later amended to encompass the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction as well.250  There was also a separate 
proposal to strip both Supreme Court and lower federal court jurisdic-
tion over constitutional challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act.251 
Notably, during the House debates over these measures, the repre-
sentatives were particularly concerned about the attempt to strip Su-
preme Court jurisdiction.  Indeed, some supporters of the original 
Pledge of Allegiance bill, who sought to eliminate lower federal court 
jurisdiction over the issue, opposed the measure once it also applied to 
the Supreme Court.252  For example, Representative Melvin Watt 
urged that, even if Congress could “constitutionally strip the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court to hear appeals,” it was not “advisable, be-
cause the result of that would be to leave each State and its highest 
courts with the final word” on the federal Constitution.253  He contin-
ued: “[M]aybe I am naive, but it seems to me that we need a final arbi-
ter in the court system and hierarchy . . . .”254 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 249 See 149 CONG. REC. 10,981 (2003); 148 CONG. REC. 12,110 (2002).  The bill provided: “No 
court established by Act of Congress shall have jurisdiction to hear or determine any claim that 
the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance . . . violates the first article of amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States.”  H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. sec. 2(a), § 1632 (2003) (as introduced). 
 250 The revised bill provided: “No court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, 
and the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question per-
taining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of, the Pledge of Alle-
giance . . . or its recitation.”  H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. sec. 2(a), § 1632 (2004) (as reported); see 150 
CONG. REC. H7328 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2004). 
 251 See 150 CONG. REC. H6580 (daily ed. July 22, 2004). The bill provided: “No court created 
by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court shall have no appellate 
jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity un-
der the Constitution of[, section 2 of the Defense of Marriage Act].”  H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. sec. 
2(a), § 1632 (2004). 
 252 Representative Melvin Watt, D-N.C., sought to return the bill to its original form by 
amending it to apply only to the inferior federal courts.  See H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 78 (2004) 
(transcript of committee hearings) (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt, D-N.C.) (stating that he sup-
ported the original bill, which sought to eliminate inferior federal court jurisdiction); 152 CONG. 
REC. H5415 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (introducing the amendment to protect Supreme Court ju-
risdiction in 2006); 150 CONG. REC. H7472 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004) (introducing the same 
amendment in 2004).  The Watt amendment was ultimately rejected in both 2006 and 2004.  See 
152 CONG. REC. H5432 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (showing that the House voted 241–183 against 
the 2006 amendment); 150 CONG. REC. H7477 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004) (showing that the House 
voted 217–202 against the 2004 amendment). 
 253 H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 78 (2004) (transcript of committee hearings) (statement of Rep. 
Melvin Watt, D-N.C.) (also stating that he was a supporter of the initial bill). 
 254 Id.; accord 150 CONG. REC. H7393 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. Judy Big-
gert, R-Ill.) (stating that she supported the original bill, which “took care of [the] renegade [lower 
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Likewise, the (mostly Democratic) opponents of these measures, 
much like their predecessors in the 1970s and 1980s, defended the fed-
eral judiciary as a whole but focused on the Supreme Court’s appellate 
review power.255  Many representatives expressed concern about the 
uniform enforcement of federal law.256  For example, Representatives 
John Conyers and Barney Frank warned that “the chaos that would 
ensue from 50 States . . . issuing conflicting opinions”257 would send 
the country “back in history to the Articles of Confederation.”258  Rep-
resentative John Dingell and others also warned that the bills would 
set “a precedent which is going to live to curse us” by encouraging fu-
ture jurisdiction-stripping attempts over issues ranging from gun rights 
and property rights259 to abortion and racial and gender equality.260 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
federal court] jurists, but . . . retained the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over this important 
constitutional issue”). 
 255 See 150 CONG. REC. H6583 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. Steny Hoyer, D-
Md.) (“If this [marriage protection] bill becomes law, it will represent the first time in our history 
that Congress has enacted legislation that completely bars any Federal court, including the United 
States Supreme Court, from considering the constitutionality of Federal legislation.  Thus, it con-
tradicts . . . Marbury v. Madison . . . .”); id. at H6581 (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., D-
Mich.) (“The legislation is the first of its kind that has ever been brought to the floor of the House 
of Representatives.  Never have we ever tried to do something as breathtaking as taking away the 
right of a Federal appeal . . . even to go to the Supreme Court . . . . This would be the only in-
stance in the history of the Congress that we have totally precluded the Federal courts from con-
sidering the constitutionality of Federal legislation.”). 
 256 For such arguments during debates over the Marriage Protection Act, see infra notes 257–
58.  Opponents of the Pledge Protection Act made similar claims.  See 152 CONG. REC. H5399–
5400 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep. Robert Scott, D-Va.) (arguing that the bill “will 
result in unprecedented confusion . . . . We may well end up with 50 interpretations and applica-
tions of a single Federal constitutional right”). 
 257 150 CONG. REC. H6581 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., D-
Mich.) (“[M]ake no mistake about it, were the bill to be enacted, the chaos that would ensue from 
50 States plus the District of Columbia issuing conflicting opinions on the marriage law would be 
irrational.”). 
 258 Id. at H6569 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass.) (arguing that the marriage protec-
tion bill would send the country “back in history to the Articles of Confederation.  Passage of this 
bill will mean that the United States Constitution, in this particular area, will have different 
meanings in different States”). 
 259 152 CONG. REC. H5412 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep. John Dingell, Jr., D-
Mich.) (“This [Pledge bill] is a precedent which is going to live to curse us . . . . Maybe a future 
Congress will want to strip court challenges to gun control legislation by gun owners or 
sportsmen.”).  For such arguments over the Marriage Protection Act, see 150 CONG. REC. H6569 
(daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass.), urging that, if Congress 
passed the measure, there would be future attempts to strip federal jurisdiction over “the second 
amendment and gun rights; and environmental land takings under the fifth amendment; the 
commerce clause[ and] financial regulation.” 
 260 See 150 CONG. REC. H6563 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. James McGovern, 
D-Mass.) (arguing that “if this [marriage protection] bill passes its proponents will be back for 
more. . . . Other issues will be on the table, civil rights and civil liberties, voting rights, choice, 
environmental protection, worker protections, all will be at risk . . . .  This bill would set a dan-
gerous, dangerous precedent”). 
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Both measures passed the House of Representatives by wide mar-
gins.261  But the bills ran into trouble once they reached the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee.  The committee took no action on either propos-
al.262  Thus, much like the jurisdiction-stripping measures of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, each bill “found its way to 
the Senate morgue.”263 
As discussed, the Senate’s design ensures that it is slower to re-
spond to changes in the political winds than the House.  Indeed, the 
gaining strength and growing conservatism of the Republican Party 
impacted the Senate more gradually.  Following the 2000 elections, the 
Senate was evenly divided fifty to fifty (with the Republicans in con-
trol only because Vice President Dick Cheney could break a tie).264  
And although the Republicans made further gains in that body in the 
2002 and 2004 elections, they never had a filibuster-proof majority.265 
Moreover, these “pledge” and “marriage” issues had only recently 
appeared on the horizon; the Ninth Circuit issued its Newdow ruling 
in 2002, and several of the early challenges to the Defense of Marriage 
Act came even later (perhaps encouraged by the Supreme Court’s 2003 
decision in Lawrence v. Texas266).267  These issues were thus likely to 
experience the usual Senate “lag.”  Finally, there was (apparently) no 
champion of these jurisdiction-stripping measures akin to Senator 
Helms who sought to dislodge the bills from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.  Thus, much like the economic nationalists in the late ni-
neteenth and early twentieth centuries, the progressives of the twenty-
first century (even if now more concentrated in the minority Demo-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 261 See 152 CONG. REC. H5433 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (showing that the House passed the 
Pledge Protection Act of 2005 by a vote of 260–167); 150 CONG. REC. H7478 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 
2004) (showing that the House passed the Pledge Protection Act of 2004 by a vote of 247–173); 
150 CONG. REC. H6612 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (showing that the House passed the Marriage 
Protection Act of 2004 by a vote of 233–194); infra Appendix, pp. 938–39 (showing the breakdown 
of votes). 
 262 For the (lack of) Senate proceedings, see Bill Summary & Status – 109th Congress (2005–
2006) – H.R.2389, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR02389:@@@X (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2011); Bill Summary & Status – 108th Congress (2003–2004) – H.R.2028, THO-
MAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR02028:@@@X (last visited Jan. 8, 2011); 
and Bill Summary & Status – 108th Congress (2003–2004) – H.R.3313, THOMAS, http://thomas. 
loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR03313:@@@X (last visited Jan. 8, 2011). 
 263 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 125, at 137.  
 264 See Jacobson, supra note 236, at 5. 
 265 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 240, at 245 (showing that, after the 2002 elections, 
the Republicans had a 51–48 majority in the Senate and that, after 2004, the party had a majority 
of 55–44). 
 266 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (invalidating a Texas law that prohibited intimate sexual con-
tact between members of the same sex and overruling the Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
 267 See cases cited supra note 243. 
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cratic Party) maintained sufficient structural veto points in the Senate 
to safeguard the federal “judicial Power.”268 
V.  THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARDS 
The history of federal jurisdiction from the late nineteenth century 
to the present day demonstrates that the lawmaking procedures of Ar-
ticle I have repeatedly safeguarded the federal judiciary.  These 
processes are not, however, an absolute bulwark against jurisdiction-
stripping efforts.  On several occasions, when there has been a persis-
tent political consensus in favor of limiting jurisdiction, Congress has 
successfully displaced the inferior federal courts.  But it has proven far 
more difficult for Congress to curb the Supreme Court’s appellate re-
view power. 
A.  Successful Efforts to Strip Inferior Federal Court Jurisdiction 
Congress has managed to restrict the jurisdiction of the inferior 
federal courts (at least in part) on several occasions.  Such jurisdiction-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 268 Notably, as the pledge and marriage cases illustrate, the lawmaking processes of Article I 
have worked to safeguard the judiciary even during periods of unified government, and even 
when the supporters of the judiciary were only a political minority.  That was likewise true during 
the Progressive era of the early twentieth century, when the economic nationalist faction of the 
Republican Party (despite its status as a political minority) managed to veto efforts to strip federal 
jurisdiction over corporate suits.  See section III.B, pp.896–99.  It thus appears that the fate of 
jurisdiction-stripping legislation cannot be explained by a theory that has gained traction in recent 
years: that partisan politics has eclipsed the checks and balances created by the Constitution, so 
that we now live in a world dominated by the “separation of parties, not powers.”  See Levinson 
& Pildes, supra note 8, at 2385 (asserting that “the separation of powers as the Framers under-
stood it . . . ha[s] ceased to exist” and that “[t]he enduring institutional form of democratic political 
competition has turned out to be not branches but political parties”).  Professors Daryl Levinson 
and Richard Pildes have argued that the scheme of separated powers envisioned by James Madi-
son — with each branch of government “checking” to ensure that the other branches do not in-
fringe on constitutional values — is unlikely to work during periods of unified government.  In-
stead, when the President, House, and Senate belong to the same political party, they are likely to 
cooperate, rather than compete.  See id. at 2316 (“The greatest threat to constitutional law’s con-
ventional understanding of, and normative goals for, separation of powers comes when govern-
ment is unified and interbranch political dynamics shift from competitive to cooperative.”); see 
also Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures — The Living Constitution, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1809 n.222 (2007) (agreeing with Professors Levinson and Pildes that “the 
branches operate very differently depending on whether they are all controlled by the same par-
ty”); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the 
Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 478–79 (2008) (same).  However, the Article I 
lawmaking process gives political minorities considerable power to veto constitutionally problem-
atic legislation — even during periods of unified government.  And as the historical survey in this 
Article demonstrates, political minorities have used those “veto points” to block jurisdiction-
stripping legislation and thereby protect the constitutional value in an independent judiciary dur-
ing periods of both divided and unified government.  Accordingly, in this context, it does not ap-
pear that the success of the scheme of separated powers has depended on the separation of par-
ties.  Although a more extensive examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, I 
hope to explore it in future work. 
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stripping attempts seem most likely to succeed when there is a major 
event that creates overwhelming political support for limitations on 
federal jurisdiction.  For example, Congress mustered the necessary 
political momentum following the stock market crash of 1929 and the 
ensuing economic depression;269 during World War II;270 and more re-
cently, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the sub-
sequent war on terror.271  These events led to multiple successful ef-
forts to restrict federal jurisdiction,272 two of which I highlight here. 
Notably, as the preceding Parts demonstrate, it is not easy for Con-
gress to assemble a supermajority to strip inferior federal court juris-
diction.  Indeed, there is good reason to believe that the above restric-
tions would not have been enacted into law absent these historical 
triggers.  The labor injunction case nicely illustrates this point.  For 
many years, labor leaders and progressive legislators sought to curb in-
ferior federal court jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes.273  
The progressives preferred to send such cases to state courts (which 
might be more favorable to workers’ claims), followed by Supreme 
Court review.274  But the same faction of economic nationalists in the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 269 See Tax Injunction Act, ch. 726, § 1, 50 Stat. 738, 738 (1937) (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 1341 (2006)) (restricting federal courts’ authority to issue injunctions in disputes over 
state taxation); Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 1, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2006)) (restricting federal courts’ authority to issue injunctions in labor disputes). 
 270 See Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 204, 56 Stat. 23, 31–33 (lapsed 1947) (al-
lowing a special “Emergency Court of Appeals” and the Supreme Court, but not any lower federal 
or state court, to review certain administrative orders); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 429–
30, 443 (1944) (upholding the statute). 
 271 The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)), and the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36 (amending § 2241(e)), together restrict federal habeas 
jurisdiction over the claims of noncitizens designated as “enemy combatants.”  See infra note 279 
(discussing the legislation). 
 272 Another example could be the jurisdictional limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the U.S. Code); and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).  Some members of Congress had sought for years to enact habeas reform but 
assembled the supermajority necessary only after the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.  See infra 
notes 286, 323 and accompanying text. 
 273 See S. REP. NO. 72-163, pt. 1, at 2–4 (1932) (stating that “[t]he Committee on the Judiciary 
has been considering the subject of injunctions in labor disputes for several years,” id. at 2, and 
detailing the efforts from 1927 to 1932); WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY 11, 71, 289–90 
(1994) (noting that, beginning in 1907, labor unions advocated legislation to restrict the labor  
injunction). 
 274 See Gunther, supra note 11, at 920 (noting that “[t]he Tax Injunction Act and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act . . . evolved from disagreements with the way federal courts handled state tax and 
labor injunction cases” and were designed to send such cases to “state tribunals”).  Although the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act purported to apply to any “court of the United States,” see § 7, 47 Stat. at 
71, legislators involved in the debates apparently understood the restriction to apply only to the 
inferior federal courts and not to the Supreme Court.  See S. REP. NO. 72-163, pt. 1, at 10 (stating 
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Republican Party — who, as we saw, successfully fought off proposals 
to restrict jurisdiction over corporate suits — also repeatedly blocked 
this proposal.275  It was not until the Great Depression that the pro-
gressive supporters of this legislation mustered sufficient political mo-
mentum to overcome their opponents’ structural veto and enact this 
reform.  The Norris-LaGuardia Act276 became law on March 23, 
1932.277 
More recently, Congress restricted federal jurisdiction in response 
to the war on terror.  The Military Commissions Act of 2006278 was 
designed to eliminate federal jurisdiction over habeas corpus claims 
filed by noncitizens who were detained by the United States govern-
ment and designated as “enemy combatants.”279  The statute routed 
the claims of alleged “enemy combatants” to a military tribunal (either 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
that Congress has the authority to “give to the inferior courts such jurisdiction as Congress in its 
wisdom deems just,” and that “having given this jurisdiction, it can, by act of Congress, take 
away all or any part of it”); H.R. REP. NO. 72-669, at 11–16 (1932) (stating that the Act applies 
only to “the inferior Federal courts,” id. at 11, and relying solely on Congress’s authority to regu-
late lower federal court jurisdiction in explaining the legality of the legislation).  Likewise, the Su-
preme Court construed the statute to apply only to inferior federal court jurisdiction.  See Lauf v. 
E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938). 
 275 See S. REP. NO. 72-163, pt. 1, at 3–4 (observing that previous versions of the labor injunc-
tion bill had been delayed and ultimately rejected due to opposition by “attorneys representing 
corporations and organizations opposed to the enactment of this kind of legislation,” id. at 3). 
 276 Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). 
 277 See id. at 70.  It may seem surprising that this law was enacted in 1932 during the Presiden-
cy of Herbert Hoover.  But the political support for labor reform increased dramatically in the 
wake of the stock market crash.  The pro-labor Democrats made major gains in Congress in the 
1930 elections.  See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 119, at 5-201 (showing that, before the 
1930 elections, Republicans had a 267–167 majority in the House and a 56–39 majority in the  
Senate, but, after the elections, Democrats had a 220–214 majority in the House and Republicans 
controlled the Senate only 48–47).  Moreover, as political science professor Stephen Skowronek 
recounts, progressive Republicans formed an alliance with these new Democratic members of 
Congress to pass measures that would address the financial crisis.  See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, 
THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE 277–78 (1997).  In this environment, the economic national-
ist faction of the Republican Party could not block the labor injunction bill in Congress.  Indeed, 
the legislation was enacted by a veto-proof majority.  See 75 CONG. REC. 5019, 5511 (1932) 
(showing that the Senate passed the measure 75–5, and the House passed it 362–14); Robert H. 
Bremner, The Background of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 9 HISTORIAN 171, 174–75 (1947). 
 278 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 
U.S.C.). 
 279 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006) (“No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear 
or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by 
the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained 
as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.”).  Congress first sought to restrict ha-
beas jurisdiction for Guantánamo Bay detainees in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA).  
Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2742, 2742 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)).  
After the Supreme Court narrowly construed the jurisdiction-stripping provision in the DTA, see 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 581–84 (2006) (concluding that the DTA did not strip habeas 
jurisdiction over pending cases), Congress amended the provision with the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006 by extending it to any detainee held by the United States and expressly stating that 
the provision applied to pending claims.  See Military Commissions Act § 7, 120 Stat. at 2635–36. 
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a combatant status review tribunal or a military commission), followed 
by judicial review in the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court.280 
Interestingly, the debates over the constitutionality of this measure 
centered around the Suspension Clause of Article I, not Article III — 
perhaps because the Military Commissions Act left some Article III 
review in place.  Opponents of the legislation (primarily socially pro-
gressive Democrats) argued that the provision constituted an invalid 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.281  Proponents, however, 
countered that the detainees had no constitutional right to habeas re-
view282 and that, even if they did have such a right, the alternative re-
view processes would serve as an adequate substitute — especially 
given the availability of Article III review.283  Ultimately, opponents 
could not muster sufficient votes in Congress to block this jurisdiction-
al restriction.284  (The habeas restriction was thus in effect until the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 280 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, sec. 105(e), § 2241(e)(2)(A), (C), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742; 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, sec. 3, §§ 950g, 950j, 120 Stat. at 2622–24.  Although the DTA 
gives the D.C. Circuit “exclusive” jurisdiction to review decisions of combatant status review tri-
bunals, and does not expressly provide for Supreme Court review, such “exclusivity” provisions 
are generally construed so as to preserve Supreme Court review.  See, e.g., Administrative Orders 
Review Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (2006) (providing that “[t]he court of appeals . . . has exclusive ju-
risdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend . . . , or to determine the validity of . . . final orders” from 
certain federal agencies); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 750–51 (2002) 
(reviewing a court of appeals decision in a case brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2342); see also Calabre-
si & Lawson, Jurisdiction Stripping, supra note 38, at 1009 (similarly concluding that the DTA 
left Supreme Court review in place). 
 281 See 152 CONG. REC. S10,366 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd, D-
W. Va.) (stating that “the military commissions bill before us would strip the U.S. Constitution of 
one of its most precious protections: the writ of habeas corpus” and claiming that the bill violated 
the Suspension Clause); 152 CONG. REC. H7515 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. 
Nancy Pelosi, D-Cal.) (“By seeking to strip Federal courts of habeas corpus review, this bill is 
practically begging to be overturned by the courts.  Habeas corpus is one of the hallmarks of our 
legal system . . . .  It is the last line of defense against arbitrary executive power.”). 
 282 See 152 CONG. REC. S10,268 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz.) 
(“[N]ever has the Court come close to holding that for alien enemy combatants there is a constitu-
tional right of habeas.”); id. at S10,266 (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C.) (similarly ar-
guing that the Supreme Court had not recognized a constitutional right to habeas review for “an 
enemy combatant noncitizen alien”). 
 283 See id. at S10,273 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn, R-Tex.) (urging that “the Detainee 
Treatment Act . . . provides an adequate substitute remedy sufficient to meet Supreme Court  
scrutiny”). 
 284 During the debates over the Military Commissions Act, Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) of-
fered an amendment that would have restored habeas jurisdiction.  See id. at S10,264.  The 
amendment was rejected by a small margin — a vote of 51–48.  152 CONG. REC. S10,369 (daily 
ed. Sept. 28, 2006).  Some members of the House of Representatives sought to bring up a similar 
amendment, but that effort was defeated.  See 152 CONG. REC. H7517, H7519–20 (daily ed. Sept. 
27, 2006).  The Senate passed the final bill by a vote of 65–34.  152 CONG. REC. S10,420 (daily 
ed. Sept. 28, 2006).  The House adopted it by a vote of 250–170.  152 CONG. REC. H7959 (daily 
ed. Sept. 29, 2006).  See infra Appendix, pp. 939–40 (showing the breakdown of votes). 
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Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush285 invalidated it on Suspension 
Clause grounds.286) 
There may have been multiple political factors underlying the 
enactment of this legislation, and I do not seek here to provide an ex-
haustive account of when proposals to restrict inferior federal court ju-
risdiction are most likely to succeed.  But these examples do suggest 
that, following certain major historical events (like the 1929 stock 
market crash and the September 11 attacks), legislators are more ca-
pable of assembling the supermajority necessary to bypass the bicam-
eralism and presentment hurdles of Article I. 
B.  Special Safeguards for Supreme Court Review 
Even when Congress has assembled sufficient political momentum 
to displace inferior federal court jurisdiction, it has consistently left the 
Supreme Court’s appellate review power in place.  For example, al-
though the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Military Commissions Act 
limited lower federal court jurisdiction, the statutes left open an ave-
nue for Supreme Court review.  Indeed, Congress has on only two oc-
casions eliminated the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  The 
structural safeguards of Article I thus seem to be particularly effective 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 285 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 286 Id. at 2274.  A separate provision of the Military Commissions Act warrants mention.  The 
provision purports to eliminate federal jurisdiction over any action “against the United States or 
its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of con-
finement” of a designated “enemy combatant.”  28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (2006).  It is unclear how the 
courts will interpret this provision.  See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274 (declining to “discuss the 
reach of the writ with respect to claims of unlawful conditions of treatment or confinement”).  
Given the Supreme Court’s practice of construing statutes so as to preserve review of at least con-
stitutional claims, see sources cited infra note 352 and accompanying text, it seems doubtful that 
the Court will read it to eliminate all federal jurisdiction.  But notably, the government also seems 
(at least in some cases) to have conceded jurisdiction over constitutional claims, instead seeking to 
prevail in “conditions of confinement” cases on other grounds.  See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents 
in Opposition, Rasul v. Myers, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009) (No. 09-227), 2009 WL 3844433 (failing to 
raise the jurisdictional argument in a case raising constitutional challenge to mistreatment at 
Guantánamo Bay).  This approach is consistent with the government’s practice in litigation under 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, when the government conceded that the statutes pre-
served review of constitutional claims.  See David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act: Habeas Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID (1996–2005), 51 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 75, 92 (2006/07).  This consistent government practice suggests another pos-
sible safeguard of federal jurisdiction (one stemming from Article II).  It may be that the Depart-
ment of Justice’s role as a “repeat player” in the federal courts (and particularly in the Supreme 
Court) makes the DOJ hesitant to argue that a statute precludes all Article III jurisdiction.  Al-
though this intriguing possibility is beyond the scope of this Article, I explore it in separate work.  
See infra notes 353–55 and accompanying text (noting this potential Article II safeguard). 
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at preserving what scholars have described as the Supreme Court’s 
“unique role” in the judiciary.287 
1.  Possible Explanations for the Supreme Court’s “Special Safe-
guards.” — The above debates provide some insight into why Supreme 
Court jurisdiction has received such special protection.  First, for those 
who favor the overall direction of federal jurisprudence, the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction is “[o]f special importance”288 because the 
Court’s “decisions . . . establish the legal and ideological framework 
within which [the lower courts] . . . operat[e].”289  Accordingly, these 
political factions have a strong incentive to exercise their structural ve-
to to preserve the Court’s authority to define the content of federal law 
for the judiciary.  And indeed, as the above debates illustrate, suppor-
ters of the judiciary have repeatedly emphasized the “special impor-
tance” of preserving Supreme Court review.290 
But even for those who oppose the federal courts’ jurisprudence, 
and are therefore willing to rein in “renegade [lower court] jurists,”291 
there are practical reasons to preserve Supreme Court review.  It may 
not serve a faction’s political goals to leave the interpretation of federal 
law to multiple administrative tribunals or to fifty different state 
courts.  For example, as Representative Watt asserted during the de-
bates over the Pledge bill: “Rather than protect the Pledge of Alle-
giance, this bill invites a patchwork of interpretations from all over the 
country.”292  He argued that Congress should preserve the “role of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in establishing uniform standards” for federal 
law.293  This was necessary to avoid what Representative Watt had 
previously described as “an absolute hodgepodge of final opinions” 
from the various state courts.294 
Furthermore, it could be extremely expensive and administratively 
cumbersome if state court (or lower federal court) decisions required 
the federal government to enforce federal law differently in different 
regions of the country.295  That may partly explain why both the Cart-
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 287 See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text (discussing scholarship on Supreme Court’s 
role). 
 288 Gillman, supra note 72, at 517. 
 289 Id. at 518. 
 290 See supra notes 29–40, 215, 255–58 and accompanying text. 
 291 150 CONG. REC. H7393 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. Judy Biggert, R-Ill.) 
(stating that she supported the original Pledge protection bill, which “took care of [the] renegade 
[lower court] jurists, but . . . retained the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over this important 
constitutional issue”). 
 292 152 CONG. REC. H5415 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt, D-N.C.). 
 293 Id. 
 294 H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 78 (2004) (transcript of the Pledge Protection Act of 2004 mark-
up) (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt, D-N.C.). 
 295 Indeed, the federal government often seeks certiorari on this basis.  See, e.g., Brief for the 
United States at 11, Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142 (2005) (No. 04-881), 2005 WL 460918, 
 
  
922 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:869 
er and the Reagan Justice Departments defended the Supreme Court’s 
appellate review power despite the two Presidents’ distinct views of 
the Court’s jurisprudence.296  During the debates over the school 
prayer bill in the late 1970s, Attorney General Griffin Bell underscored 
that such jurisdiction-stripping measures “run afoul of the public in-
terest in . . . a uniform, definitive and dispositive nation-wide resolu-
tion of issues of constitutional magnitude.”297  Likewise, in the early 
1980s, Attorney General William French Smith doubted not only the 
constitutionality but also the wisdom of proposals to strip Supreme 
Court jurisdiction.298  Attorney General Smith, much like his predeces-
sor, warned that “[s]tate courts could reach disparate conclusions on 
identical questions of federal law” and declared that “[t]he integrity of 
our system of federal law depends upon a single court of last resort 
having a final say on the resolution of federal questions.”299 
Accordingly, although “uniformity” may not be a constitutional re-
quirement,300 it seems to be a matter of great practical (and bipartisan) 
concern to political leaders.  There appears to be a strong consensus 
that the country needs “a final arbiter in the court system and hier-
archy.”301  As we have seen, this consensus is not strong enough to 
prevent Supreme Court jurisdiction-stripping bills from passing one 
chamber of Congress.  But this sentiment, combined with the veto ef-
forts of supporters of the judiciary, generally seems strong enough  
to prevent such bills from attaining the supermajority required by  
Article I. 
2.  Breakdown in the Article I Process. — There have been only 
two instances in which efforts to strip the Supreme Court’s appellate 
review power have successfully navigated the bicameralism and pre-
sentment protections of Article I.  Notably, both cases involved an (ar-
guable) breakdown in the Article I legislative process. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
at *11 (urging that “[t]his Court’s review is warranted to resolve [a] direct circuit conflict, which 
prevents the uniform administration of . . . the federal student loan program”). 
 296 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 71, at 66–68 (noting the Presidents’ “radically different” 
approaches, with Carter deferring to the Court on issues like abortion, and Reagan attacking it). 
 297 125 CONG. REC. 7637 (1979) (quoting Letter from Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., to Sen. Abra-
ham Ribicoff, D-Conn., Chairman, S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations (Apr. 9, 1979)). 
 298 See 128 CONG. REC. 9093–97 (1982) (letter dated May 6, 1982, from Attorney General Wil-
liam French Smith to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond) (arguing that 
laws preventing the Court from hearing federal constitutional claims would unconstitutionally 
interfere with its “core functions”). 
 299 Id. at 9097. 
 300 See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1578 & n.27 (2008) (not-
ing that “many . . . disagree with the claim that uniformity is constitutionally prescribed,” id. at 
1578, and citing legal scholars who argue that any claim that uniformity is constitutionally re-
quired lacks textual support). 
 301 H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 78 (2004) (transcript of the Pledge Protection Act of 2004 mark-
up) (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt, D-N.C.). 
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The first such attempt was in 1868 and arose out of the case of 
William McCardle.  In 1867, federal authorities in Mississippi detained 
McCardle for publishing newspaper articles that severely criticized the 
military’s Reconstruction activities.302  The lower courts denied 
McCardle’s habeas petition, so he sought review in the Supreme Court 
under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,303 which permitted direct ap-
peals from the lower federal courts.304  (Prior to that 1867 statute, un-
der the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court could review such 
cases only if the detained individual filed an original habeas petition in 
the Court.305)  The Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case, 
during which McCardle challenged not only the legality of his deten-
tion but also the constitutionality of the Reconstruction laws.306 
Notably, in the late 1860s, Congress was controlled by the Republi-
can Party, in large part because the representatives of the predomi-
nantly Democratic Southern states were excluded from the legisla-
ture.307  This Republican Congress was heavily invested in the 
Reconstruction efforts and other civil rights reforms in the South.308  
(The party did not turn its focus to economic nationalism until the ear-
ly 1870s.309)  Thus, soon after the oral argument in Ex Parte McCar-
dle, several House Republicans introduced a rider to repeal the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction under the 1867 Act.310  The measure passed the 
House with no debate and was subject to very little debate before 
passing the Senate.311  The bill was then, however, vetoed by President 
Andrew Johnson.312 
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 302 See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 
236 (1973) (observing that McCardle was “charged with disturbing the peace . . . and impeding 
reconstruction, solely on the basis of several” statements he authored and published in the Vicks-
burg Times). 
 303 Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. 
 304 See id. § 1, 14 Stat. at 385–86; Van Alstyne, supra note 302, at 237. 
 305 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (permitting the Court to issue writs 
of habeas corpus). 
 306 See Van Alstyne, supra note 302, at 238 (noting that McCardle argued for the unconstitu-
tionality of the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428). 
 307 See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 104 (1998) (noting 
that, during this era, “Congress excluded all representatives . . . from the Southern states”); HIS-
TORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 119, at 5-201 (showing the Republican control of Congress in 
the late 1860s). 
 308 See supra note 105. 
 309 See supra note 105. 
 310 See Van Alstyne, supra note 302, at 239.  
 311 See CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 2098 (1868) (statement of Sen. Thomas An-
drews Hendricks, D-Ind.) (noting during the debate to override the President’s veto that originally 
the bill “was gotten through the Senate . . . without an opportunity to debate”); Van Alstyne, supra 
note 302, at 239. 
 312 See CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 2094 (1868) (showing that, on March 25, 1868, 
Andrew Johnson vetoed the bill on the ground that it was “not in harmony with the spirit and 
intention of the Constitution”).  
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Both chambers held somewhat more extensive debates in determin-
ing whether to override the veto.  The Democrats in Congress accused 
the Republicans of seeking to block Supreme Court review of the 
Southern Reconstruction efforts.313  And the Radical Republicans, at 
least in the House, did not deny the charge.314  But in 1868, the Re-
publicans had considerable majorities in both chambers of Congress315 
and were more than able to assemble the two-thirds majority neces-
sary to override President Johnson’s veto and enact the jurisdiction-
stripping legislation.316 
In Ex parte McCardle,317 the Supreme Court applied this newly es-
tablished limit on its appellate jurisdiction and dismissed McCardle’s 
appeal.318  But the Court also stated that “[t]he act of 1868 does not 
except from [its] jurisdiction any cases but appeals . . . under the act of 
1867.  It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exer-
cised.”319  In Ex parte Yerger,320 the Court clarified this declaration, 
holding that it could still review lower court decisions by way of an 
original habeas petition under the Judiciary Act of 1789.321 
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 313 See id. at 2167 (statement of Rep. George Woodward, D-Pa.) (declaring that the legislation 
was motivated “merely by a desire to prevent the Supreme Court of the United States from decid-
ing McCardle’s case.  And the reason of this desire was a fear that the Supreme Court would dec-
lare the reconstruction laws unconstitutional and void”); id. at 2127 (statement of Sen. Charles 
Buckalew, D-Pa.) (“This law is to be repealed, this jurisdiction is to be withdrawn from the Su-
preme Court, because it is necessary to preserve the reconstruction system enacted by Congress 
from molestation, injury, perhaps demolition, by the court.”). 
 314 See id. at 2061 (statement of Rep. James F. Wilson, R-Iowa) (“Most assuredly it was my in-
tention to take away the jurisdiction given by the act of 1867 reaching the McCardle case . . . .”); 
see also id. at 2064 (statement of Rep. Horace Maynard, R-Tenn.) (“[T]his McCardle case was 
brought up for no purpose in the world except to test and settle political questions. . . . [D]ecency 
and propriety . . . require that we should, by our legislation, put an end to that suit and save the 
court from further annoyance or further occasion to . . . make any decision of that kind.”). 
 315 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 119, at 5-201 (showing that the Republicans had 
a 143–49 majority in the House and a 42–11 majority in the Senate). 
 316 See Repeal Act of 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44, 44 (providing “[t]hat so much of the act ap-
proved February [5, 1867,] . . . as authorizes an appeal from the judgment of the circuit court to 
the Supreme Court of the United States, or the exercise of any such jurisdiction by said Supreme 
Court on appeals which have been or may hereafter be taken, be, and the same is, hereby re-
pealed”); CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 2170 (1868) (showing that, on March 27, 1868, 
the House voted 114–34 to override the veto); id. at 2128 (showing that, on March 26, 1868, the 
Senate voted 33–9 to override President Johnson’s veto); infra Appendix, p. 933 (showing the 
breakdown of votes).  Notably, Congress restored this part of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in 
1885.  See William M. Wiecek, The Great Writ and Reconstruction: The Habeas Corpus Act of 
1867, 36 J. S. HIST. 530, 543–44 (1970). 
 317 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). 
 318 Id. at 515 (“It is quite clear . . . that this court cannot proceed to pronounce judgment in this 
case, for it has no longer jurisdiction of the appeal . . . .”). 
 319 Id. 
 320 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869). 
 321 Id. at 105–06. 
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The Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction was again targeted in a 
provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996322 (AEDPA).  The history behind this statute differs in important 
respects from the events of 1868.  First, AEDPA was not a sudden ex-
ercise of legislative will, but instead was the culmination of years of 
habeas reform efforts (which assembled sufficient political momentum 
only after the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995).323  Moreover, AEDPA 
reflected legislative deference to the Court in some respects.  It di-
rected inferior federal courts to respect final state court decisions in 
criminal cases unless they violated “clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court.”324  Such a provision seems to sig-
nal, as Professor Vicki Jackson has suggested, a “congressional belief 
that the Supreme Court’s powers with respect to . . . federal law are 
broader than those of the lower federal courts,”325 because of its “su-
preme hierarchical position”326 in the judiciary. 
Nevertheless, one provision of AEDPA did restrict the Court’s ap-
pellate review power.  The statute requires an inmate to obtain leave 
from a federal court of appeals before filing a second (or “successive”) 
habeas petition and provides that “[t]he grant or denial of [such] an au-
thorization . . . shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a 
petition . . . for a writ of certiorari.”327 
As in McCardle and Yerger, the Supreme Court read this restriction 
narrowly.  In Felker v. Turpin,328 the Court declared that, although the 
statute prohibited a direct appeal from a lower court decision “exercis-
ing [this] ‘gatekeeping’ function,”329 it had “not repealed [the Court’s] 
authority to entertain original habeas petitions.”330  While this “reser-
vation of authority” may have seemed at the time like a fairly empty 
gesture (given that the Court had not granted an original habeas peti-
tion in decades),331 recent events have demonstrated the importance of 
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 322 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
 323 See Carrie M. Bowden, Note, The Need for Comity: A Proposal for Federal Court Review of 
Suppression Issues in the Dual Sovereignty Context After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 215–16 (2003). 
 324 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
 325 Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the 
Federal Courts — Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2455 (1998). 
 326 Id. at 2454. 
 327 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E). 
 328 518 U.S. 651 (1996). 
 329 Id. at 661. 
 330 Id. at 660. 
 331 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
271, 298–99 (6th ed. 2009). 
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this protection.  On August 17, 2009, the Court in In re Davis332 
granted an original petition in a capital case and directed the federal 
district court to consider the inmate’s claim of actual innocence.333 
In both McCardle and Felker, the Supreme Court applied what 
Professor Ernest Young has referred to as “resistance norms.”334  The 
Court did not declare that Congress lacked the constitutional authority 
to restrict its appellate jurisdiction, but instead (applying “modern” 
principles of constitutional avoidance) read the relevant statutes so as 
to preserve its jurisdiction.335  Understood in light of the analysis in 
this Article, the Court’s approach may be defensible.  Additional judi-
cial oversight seems particularly appropriate when there is a break-
down in the usual Article I safeguards. 
McCardle involved perhaps the paradigmatic case for caution.  As 
Professor Bruce Ackerman has pointed out (in his work on the Four-
teenth Amendment), in the late 1860s, “Congress excluded all repre-
sentatives, however qualified they may have been, from the Southern 
states.”336  For that reason, the Reconstruction Republicans managed 
easily not only to push their jurisdiction-stripping measure through 
Congress, but also to override President Johnson’s veto.337  As Profes-
sor Ackerman has argued, this complete exclusion of one-third of the 
country raises serious questions about the constitutional status of this 
Congress.338  In this context, given the lack of structural safeguards, 
the Supreme Court’s use of resistance norms seems justified. 
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 332 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009). 
 333 See id. at 1.  On remand, the district court held that Davis failed to establish innocence by 
clear and convincing evidence.  See In re Davis, No. CV409-130, slip op. at 166–68, 2010 WL 
3385081, at *59–60 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010). 
 334 See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of 
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1585 (2000) (proposing “the concept of ‘resistance 
norms’ — that is, constitutional rules that raise obstacles to particular governmental actions 
without barring those actions entirely”); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Ac-
tion: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 
YALE L.J. 2, 4 (2008) (asserting that “courts often can, do, and should craft doctrines that raise the 
costs to government decisionmakers of enacting constitutionally problematic policies, rather than 
attempting to designate certain government actions . . . as permissible or impermissible”). 
 335 See supra notes 317–21, 328–30 and accompanying text; Adrian Vermeule, Saving Construc-
tions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1947 (1997) (distinguishing “the classical version of avoidance, which 
directs courts to interpret statutes to save them from a formal ruling of unconstitutionality” from 
“the modern version of avoidance, which directs courts to interpret statutes to avoid constitutional 
questions as well as rulings of unconstitutionality”). 
 336 ACKERMAN, supra note 307, at 104. 
 337 Notably, President Johnson’s political authority was rather weak at the time, because he 
had already been impeached by the House.  See CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 2095 
(1868) (statement of Sen. George Williams, R-Or.) (urging legislators to override the veto 
promptly — indeed, by the next day — because “there is very little time in which to consider mat-
ters of legislation before the impeachment trial commences” in the Senate). 
 338 See ACKERMAN, supra note 307, at 103 (questioning whether a “federal assembly excluding 
these states” may “count as a ‘Congress’”). 
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AEDPA, however, is a more complex story.  In that case, there was 
no formal breakdown in the Article I bicameralism and presentment 
process (at least not at the federal level).  Indeed, the country at that 
time had a divided government — a Republican-controlled Congress 
and a Democratic President — all of whom supported habeas 
reform.339  Nor was the statute targeted at the Supreme Court in the 
same way as the 1868 Repeal Act; on the contrary, other provisions of 
the law expressly recognized a special role for the Court in defining the 
content of federal law. 
In one sense, however, AEDPA did involve a breakdown in elec-
toral processes analogous to that in the late 1860s.  In virtually every 
state, prison inmates are denied access to the ballot.340  Thus, much 
like the Southerners in the late 1860s (such as William McCardle), the 
individuals with the most at stake in the AEDPA appellate review 
process effectively had no representation in Congress.  Accordingly, 
there is at least an argument that the application of resistance norms 
in Felker was appropriate to correct for this “gap” in the usual Ar-
ticle I protections.341 
Nevertheless, it is more difficult to describe the jurisdictional re-
striction in AEDPA as an instance of structural breakdown.342  Ac-
cordingly, the Court’s interpretive approach in Felker may not be justi-
fiable along the same lines as that in McCardle.  This case thus seems 
to raise the important normative question of how the judiciary should 
react when a jurisdiction-stripping measure (in the absence of a struc-
tural breakdown) gains the supermajority necessary to be enacted into 
law. 
C.  Implications 
The lawmaking processes of Article I have proven to be an impor-
tant safeguard for the federal judiciary.  Indeed, the structural safe-
guards of Article I have largely met the concerns raised by academics 
in the literature on jurisdiction stripping.  Scholars who argue that 
Congress has “plenary power” over federal jurisdiction still contend 
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 339 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 119, at 5-202; Bowden, supra note 323, at 215 
(noting that the bill was a product of compromise from “opposing sides of the reform movement”). 
 340 See Lani Guinier, Supreme Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 23, 39–40 
(2002); ACLU, VOTING WITH A CRIMINAL RECORD 3 (2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
files/pdfs/racialjustice/votingwithacriminalrecord_report.pdf (noting that only two states — Maine 
and Vermont — currently allow citizens to vote after a felony conviction). 
 341 Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 101–04 (1980) (urging that judicial 
review should be reserved for cases where the political process has broken down). 
 342 Notably, the courts have, by and large, upheld laws that disenfranchise prisoners against 
substantive constitutional challenge.  See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54–56 (1974) 
(rejecting equal protection challenge to such a restriction); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 
1214, 1224 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (same). 
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that Congress should generally refrain from exercising that power.343  
Furthermore, scholars who contest the “plenary power” view have ar-
gued either that Congress should leave jurisdiction in some federal 
court or that Congress has a special obligation to preserve the Su-
preme Court’s unique role.344  Supporters of the judiciary have used 
the veto points created by Article I to meet both concerns by blocking 
most jurisdiction-stripping attempts and by making particularly strong 
efforts to protect the Supreme Court. 
But these procedures have not prevented all restrictions on federal 
jurisdiction.  The imperfection of these structural safeguards raises the 
question of how courts should react in those rare instances when legis-
lators do assemble the supermajority necessary to strip jurisdiction.  
Although I do not seek to resolve this important normative question 
here, I offer some thoughts on how this Article’s analysis might impact 
the debate. 
First, these Article I safeguards could work in conjunction with 
judicial enforcement of Article III.  Indeed, nothing in my argument is 
necessarily inconsistent with the scholarship proposing judicially en-
forceable limits on Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction.  One 
could view my argument as supplementing that prior scholarship: The 
first line of defense for the federal judiciary is the Article I bicameral-
ism and presentment process.  The second line of defense is judicial 
enforcement — according to whichever scholarly theory one chooses to 
adopt (such as Professor Hart’s “essential functions” theory or Profes-
sor Amar’s contention that some federal court must be available to 
hear federal question cases).345  Thus, if Congress were to go “too far” 
(a concept defined by whatever theory of judicial enforcement that one 
adopts), the courts could step in and strike down the jurisdiction-
stripping law. 
But such reliance on judicial enforcement may give insufficient 
weight to the political process.  Thus, courts could instead treat these 
Article I safeguards as the only protection for the federal judiciary.  
Under this approach, in the absence of a structural breakdown (such 
as the one in McCardle), the courts should generally give effect to the 
jurisdictional limitations that survive the Article I lawmaking process. 
This approach would accord with much of the Supreme Court’s ju-
risprudence.  The Court has repeatedly given effect to jurisdictional 
limits on the lower courts — at least when such limitations were chal-
lenged as a violation of Article III.  For example, in Lauf v. E.G. Shin-
ner & Co.,346 the Court expressly upheld the jurisdictional limitation 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 343 See sources cited supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
 344 See supra notes 23–40 and accompanying text. 
 345 See sources cited supra notes 27, 29 and accompanying text. 
 346 303 U.S. 323 (1938).  
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in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, stating that “[t]here can be no question 
of the power of Congress . . . to define and limit the jurisdiction of the 
inferior courts of the United States.”347  The Court has likewise upheld 
other jurisdictional restrictions on the lower courts348 and has (at least 
in dicta) affirmed Congress’s power to remove classes of cases from the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.349  Thus, the Court has often indicated a 
willingness to enforce the jurisdictional limitations that survive the Ar-
ticle I lawmaking process. 
This approach would have strong normative underpinnings.  As 
Professor Charles Black observed, the very existence of a congressional 
power to limit federal jurisdiction can serve to legitimize judicial deci-
sions.350  Professor Black explained: “‘Jurisdiction’ is the power to de-
cide.  If Congress has wide and deep-going power over the courts’ ju-
risdiction, then the courts’ power to decide is a continuing and visible 
concession from a democratically formed Congress.”351  Thus, when 
Congress fails to enact a statute like the Norris-LaGuardia Act and 
leaves federal jurisdiction in place, it signals (by its forbearance) that  
it has decided to trust certain matters to the independent federal  
judiciary. 
As we have seen, the structural safeguards of Article I are quite ef-
fective at ensuring that Congress exercises such restraint.  As a result, 
when the political impetus for reform is strong enough to overcome 
those structural hurdles (except in cases of a structural breakdown), 
federal courts should perhaps respect that overwhelming democratic 
consensus.  That may be particularly true given that some federal ju-
risdiction (at the Supreme Court level) is likely to remain in place.  It 
has proven especially challenging for legislators to assemble the su-
permajority necessary to strip the Court’s appellate review power. 
But this latter approach may not be entirely satisfying in those 
(rare) instances when Congress does enact jurisdiction-stripping legis-
lation, including that which applies to the Supreme Court.  There may, 
however, be an intermediate alternative — one that would extend the 
concept of “resistance norms” beyond cases of structural breakdown, 
and one that would accord with another line of Supreme Court juris-
prudence.  The courts could resist efforts to strip federal jurisdiction 
through statutory construction, requiring a super-strong “clear state-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 347 Id. at 330. 
 348 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 429–30, 437–38 (1944) (upholding a law that al-
lowed the Supreme Court, but not a lower court, to review certain administrative orders); Sheldon 
v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449–50 (1850). 
 349 See, e.g., The “Francis Wright,” 105 U.S. 381, 386 (1882) (“Not only may whole classes of 
cases be kept out of the [Supreme Court’s appellate] jurisdiction altogether, but particular classes 
of questions may be subjected to re-examination and review, while others are not.”). 
 350 See BLACK, supra note 13, at 18. 
 351 Id. 
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ment” from Congress before concluding that a statute has eliminated 
all federal review power. 
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that Congress 
has plenary authority to limit (and even eliminate) the jurisdiction of 
the lower federal courts and its own appellate jurisdiction, it has been 
reluctant to construe statutes as removing all avenues of federal court 
review.  That has been true even in the absence of a (clear) structural 
breakdown.  Thus, the Court in Felker identified an avenue through 
which, in exceptional cases, it could examine lower court decisions in 
habeas cases.  Likewise, although the Court has upheld restrictions on 
the lower courts, it has always interpreted such provisions narrowly in 
order to preserve review of constitutional claims.352 
Furthermore, and perhaps surprisingly, this “intermediate” ap-
proach has repeatedly been supported by the executive branch.  Thus, 
in Felker, the Solicitor General encouraged the Supreme Court to 
adopt a narrow construction of the appellate review provision in 
AEDPA.353  Likewise, the Department of Justice has (especially in re-
cent decades) repeatedly urged the courts to construe broadly worded 
jurisdiction-stripping laws narrowly in order to preserve federal juris-
diction over constitutional claims.354  This support from a coequal 
branch of the federal government undoubtedly gives the judiciary en-
hanced confidence in construing jurisdiction-stripping laws narrowly.  
Indeed, this consistent executive branch practice suggests an additional 
structural protection for the federal courts — one based in Article II.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 352 See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988); 
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1974); David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas 
Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 
2481, 2490 (1998) (“The presumption . . . is so strong that the Supreme Court has never found that 
a jurisdictional statute barred judicial review of a constitutional claim.”).  
 353 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11–12, Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 
(1996) (No. 95-8836), 1996 WL 284697, at *11–12 (asserting that AEDPA “does not divest this 
Court of its jurisdiction to entertain original petitions for habeas corpus” and thus “does not work 
an unconstitutional restriction of the jurisdiction of this Court,” id. at *12). 
 354 The most well known example is the Justice Department’s approach in litigation over 
AEDPA and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, when the gov-
ernment conceded that these statutes preserved review of constitutional questions.  See Cole, su-
pra note 352, at 2484 (observing that “the federal government . . . conceded . . . that statutory lan-
guage appearing to preclude all judicial review should be read to preserve review” of substantial 
constitutional claims); McConnell, supra note 286, at 90 (same).  But the government has also en-
couraged the courts to construe jurisdiction-stripping laws narrowly in other contexts.  See, e.g., 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Demore, 538 U.S. 510 (No. 01-1491), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/01-1491.pdf (Solicitor Gener-
al Ted Olson stating, in response to a question from Justice Scalia regarding whether the relevant 
statute precluded jurisdiction, that “it’s the Government’s position . . . that that provision does 
not apply to a habeas corpus challenge to the constitutionality of the statute itself”). 
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(Although a full discussion of this possibility is beyond the scope of 
this Article, I explore it in separate work.355) 
Notably, this interpretive approach would not affect Congress’s 
ability to enact most jurisdiction-stripping measures.  The Court ap-
plies this clear statement rule only in certain contexts that implicate 
what it views as particularly important constitutional values (such as 
limits on its own appellate jurisdiction and judicial review of constitu-
tional claims).  This theory would leave Congress free to enact other 
jurisdiction-stripping laws, such as the Norris-LaGuardia Act, that do 
not impinge on such values. 
This “clear statement” approach may thus have the dual benefit of 
not only giving some effect to the Article I legislative process, but also 
ensuring (in certain areas of particular constitutional concern) that this 
process works.  As Professor Young has stated, clear statement rules 
“add to the hurdles that any legislation must pass, by increasing the 
political costs that proponents must incur in order to achieve their ob-
jectives.”356  Under this approach, Congress could potentially respond 
to a judicial decision by reenacting the jurisdiction-stripping law in 
more clearly articulated terms.  But supporters of the judiciary (even if 
they were only in the minority) could again seek to use the structural 
veto offered by the bicameralism and presentment process. 
This approach is not without flaw.  Clear statement rules have re-
cently been the target of substantial negative academic commentary.357  
Although such rules may interfere with congressional power less than 
outright invalidation, they nevertheless impose a “clarity tax” on Con-
gress that may be unwarranted.358  Such an approach may be particu-
larly inappropriate in this context, where the bicameralism and pre-
sentment procedures already serve remarkably well in the first 
instance to block jurisdiction-stripping measures. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 355 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction (Nov. 8, 2010) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); supra note 286. 
 356 Young, supra note 334, at 1608–09. 
 357 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 629–40 (1992) (criticizing 
the Court’s recent use of clear statement rules on multiple grounds).  Many clear statement rules, 
including those discussed here, are a subset of the canon of constitutional avoidance and accord-
ingly are subject to the numerous critiques that have been levied against that canon.  See, e.g., 
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation — in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983) (arguing that the avoidance canon “create[s] a judge-made constitu-
tional ‘penumbra’”); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74 (assert-
ing that the avoidance canon may at times be as great a “judicial intrusion” as outright invalida-
tion because it leads courts to interpret statutes “in ways that its drafters did not anticipate[] 
and . . . may not have preferred”). 
 358 John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 
403, 449 (2010). 
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Ultimately, my goal here is not to advocate one approach over 
another.  Indeed, the primary focus of my Article is not to determine 
how the courts should react on the rare occasions when Congress does 
enact jurisdiction-stripping legislation.  Instead, it is to show that our 
Article I lawmaking process offers a crucial (and previously over-
looked) protection for the federal judiciary that renders such legislation 
extremely difficult to enact. 
Thus, the federal judiciary is not (as many scholars have previously 
assumed) at the mercy of Congress.  Supporters of the judiciary have 
repeatedly used the structural tools of Article I to protect the Article 
III judiciary.  That has been particularly true at the level of the Su-
preme Court.  The structural safeguards of Article I have worked es-
pecially well to ensure the Court’s position as the “final arbiter in the 
court system and hierarchy.”359 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The bicameralism and presentment procedures of Article I were 
expressly designed to channel the influence of “factions.”360  “The key 
to making the Constitution work lay in finding a way to harness these 
[competing] political interests . . . for the benefit of constitutional en-
forcement.”361  This structural design seems to have served its purpose 
in protecting the federal judiciary.  Even when the federal courts have 
issued controversial opinions that trigger wide public condemnation, 
supporters of the judiciary have repeatedly used their structural veto 
points to block jurisdiction-stripping proposals. 
These structural safeguards have been especially effective at ensur-
ing the Supreme Court’s role atop the judicial hierarchy.  Supporters 
of the federal judiciary have, in all but two instances, managed  
to preserve the Court’s “special” role in “establish[ing] the le-
gal . . . framework within which [the lower courts] . . . operat[e].”362 
Thus, contrary to the concerns of many scholars, the Constitution 
does not, by permitting Congress to regulate federal jurisdiction, “au-
thoriz[e] its own destruction.”363  Instead, our system has relied — with 
apparent success — on the structural safeguards of Article I to pre-
serve the Article III judicial power. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 359 H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 78 (2004) (transcript of committee hearings) (statement of Rep. 
Melvin Watt, D-N.C.). 
 360 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 361 Kramer, supra note 90, at 727. 
 362 Gillman, supra note 72, at 518. 
 363 Hart, supra note 1, at 1365. 
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APPENDIX 
SENATE VOTE ON BILL TO REPEAL  
1867 APPELLATE REVIEW PROVISIONS 
MARCH 26, 1868 
CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2128 (1868) 
 
 Vote 
Party Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Democrat 5 1 2 8 
Republican 2 31 9 42 
Unconditional Unionist  1 1 2 
Unionist 2   2 
Total 9 33 12 54 
 
HOUSE VOTE ON BILL TO REPEAL  
1867 APPELLATE REVIEW PROVISIONS 
MARCH 27, 1868 
CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2170 (1868) 
 
 Vote 
Party Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Conservative   1 1 
Conservative Republican   1 1 
Democrat 33  11 44 
Independent Republican 1 1  2 
Republican  113 28 141 
Total 34 114 41 189 
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HOUSE VOTE ON CULBERSON BILL: 1880 
MARCH 4, 1880 
10 CONG. REC. 1305 (1880) 
 
 Vote
Party Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Democrat 1 117 23 141 
Greenbacker  5 2 7 
Independent Democrat  6 1 7 
National  3  3 
Republican 73 28 30 131 
None  3  3 
Total 74 162 56 292 
 
HOUSE VOTE ON CULBERSON BILL: 1883 
JANUARY 16, 1883 
14 CONG. REC. 1254 (1883) 
 
 Vote 
Party Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Democrat  89 40 129 
Greenbacker  4  4 
Independent   1 1 
Independent Democrat   2 2 
Independent Republican   1 1 
National  1  1 
Republican 67 40 43 150 
None   3 3 
Total 67 134 90 291 
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SENATE VOTE ON SCHOOL PRAYER AMENDMENT364 
(ADDING THE AMENDMENT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF  
EDUCATION BILL) 
APRIL 5, 1979 
125 CONG. REC. 7581 (1979) 
 
  Vote
Party Region Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Democrat 
South 1 16 3 20 
Non-South 26 8 4 38 
Independent 
South  1  1 
Non-South    0 
Republican 
South 1 5 1 7 
Non-South 9 17 8 34 
Total  37 47 16 100 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
364 For the purposes of this appendix, the “South” includes the following states: Alabama, Arkan-
sas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Caroli-
na, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
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SENATE VOTE ON SCHOOL PRAYER AMENDMENT 
(ADDING THE AMENDMENT TO THE JUDICIARY BILL) 
APRIL 9, 1979 
125 CONG. REC. 7644 (1979) 
 
  Vote
Party Region Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Democrat 
South  18 2 20 
Non-South 28 7 2 37 
Independent 
South  1  1 
Non-South    0 
Republican 
South 1 5 1 7 
Non-South 11 20 3 34 
Total  40 51 8 99 
 
SENATE VOTE ON SCHOOL PRAYER AMENDMENT 
(PASSING THE AMENDMENT AS PART OF THE JUDICIARY BILL) 
APRIL 9, 1979 
125 CONG. REC. 7648 (1979) 
 
  Vote
Party Region Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Democrat 
South 1 16 3 20 
Non-South 18 17 3 38 
Independent 
South  1  1 
Non-South    0 
Republican 
South  6 1 7 
Non-South 11 21 2 34 
Total  30 61 9 100 
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SENATE VOTE ON SCHOOL PRAYER AMENDMENT 
(REMOVING THE AMENDMENT FROM THE DEPARTMENT  
OF EDUCATION BILL) 
APRIL 9, 1979 
125 CONG. REC. 7657 (1979) 
 
  Vote
Party Region Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Democrat 
South 12 7 1 20 
Non-South 4 32 2 38 
Independent 
South 1   1 
Non-South    0 
Republican 
South 6  1 7 
Non-South 17 14 3 34 
Total  40 53 7 100 
 
SENATE VOTE ON BUSING 
FEBRUARY 4, 1982 
128 CONG. REC. 886 (1982) 
 
  Vote 
Party Region Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Democrat 
South 2 14  16 
Non-South 22 7 1 30 
Independent 
South  1  1 
Non-South    0 
Republican 
South  9 2 11 
Non-South 14 27 1 42 
Total  38 58 4 100 
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HOUSE VOTE ON MARRIAGE PROTECTION ACT OF 2004 
JULY 22, 2004 
150 CONG. REC. H6612 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) 
 
 Vote
Party Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Democrat 176 26 3 205 
Democrat/Republican  2  2 
Independent 1   1 
Republican 17 205 5 227 
Total 194 233 8 435 
 
HOUSE VOTE ON PLEDGE PROTECTION ACT OF 2004 
SEPTEMBER 23, 2004 
150 CONG. REC. H7478 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004) 
 
 Vote 
Party Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Democrat 165 35 5 205 
Democrat/Republican  2  2 
Independent 1   1 
Republican 7 210 8 225 
Total 173 247 13 433 
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HOUSE VOTE ON PLEDGE PROTECTION ACT OF 2006 
JULY 19, 2006 
152 CONG. REC. H5433 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) 
 
 Vote
Party Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Democrat 158 39 4 201 
Independent 1   1 
Republican 8 221 1 230 
Total 167 260 5 432 
 
SENATE VOTE ON SPECTER AMENDMENT TO  
PRESERVE HABEAS JURISDICTION 
SEPTEMBER 28, 2006 
152 CONG. REC. S10,369 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) 
 
 Vote 
Party Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Democrat 1 43  44 
Independent  1  1 
Republican 50 4 1 55 
Total 51 48 1 100 
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SENATE VOTE ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006 
SEPTEMBER 28, 2006 
152 CONG. REC. S10,420 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) 
 
 Vote
Party Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Democrat 32 12  44 
Independent 1   1 
Republican 1 53 1 55 
Total 34 65 1 100 
 
HOUSE VOTE ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006 
SEPTEMBER 29, 2006 
152 CONG. REC. H7959 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) 
 
 Vote
Party Nay Yea No Vote Total 
Democrat 162 32 7 201 
Independent 1   1 
Republican 7 218 5 230 
Total 170 250 12 432 
 
